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ESSAY
FRIENDS OF THE COURT: EVALUATING THE
SUPREME COURT’S AMICUS INVITATIONS
Katherine Shaw†
Approximately once each Term, the Supreme Court invites
the participation of an amicus curiae, typically because one
party to a case chooses not to advance a particular argument
or declines to participate at all.
These amicus invitations have largely escaped both public
notice and academic debate.  Yet they occur at the intersection
of two important recent critiques of the Court: first, the increas-
ing dominance of Supreme Court practice by a small, elite
cadre of specialized lawyers; and second, the Court’s status
as perhaps the least transparent institution in American pub-
lic life.
This Essay unfolds an important new account, both de-
scriptive and normative, of a largely invisible practice.  The
findings are at once predictable and surprising: in recent
years, amicus invitations have invariably gone to former law
clerks of the Justices, but at the same time have increasingly
been granted to first-time advocates.  These findings, and
others, suggest that both peril and promise inhere in the prac-
tice of amicus invitation: the practice threatens troubling distri-
butional consequences and potential distortions of legal
outcomes, but it also holds out the prospect of more democrati-
cally distributed advocacy.  More broadly, examining the prac-
tice—both as it is currently constituted, and as it might be
refined—sheds considerable light on the Court as an institu-
tion, a subset of the advocates who appear before it, and the
ways institutional design choices can shape the development
of the law.
† Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  For gener-
ous assistance and feedback on this project along the way, I am grateful to Akhil
Amar, Rachel Barkow, Jonathan Marc Bearak, Neal Devins, Lee Epstein, Richard
Epstein, Jessie Ford, Barry Friedman, Myriam Gilles, Brian Goldman, Linda
Greenhouse, Chris Hayes, Michael Herz, Vicki Jackson, Richard Lazarus, Daryl
Levinson, Richard Posner, Alex Reinert, Judith Resnik, Susan Smelcer, Alex
Stein, and participants in Cardozo’s Junior Faculty Workshop and NYU’s Consti-
tutional Theory Colloquium.  Kate Giessel, Sophia Gurule´, David Kurlander, Sam
Markowitz, Madelyn Morris, and Talya Seidman provided superb research
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 29, 2015, a young first-time advocate approached
the Supreme Court lectern.  This fact was not so remarkable;
although first-timers are increasingly rare at the Supreme
Court,1 on this day alone three of the five attorneys who argued
before the Court were doing so for the first time.2  What was
unusual was the mechanism by which this young lawyer, Wil-
1 See Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014, 10:30
AM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/ [https://
perma.cc/N6YC-5ZV2]; Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within
the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J.
1487, 1520–21 (2008).
2 Both lawyers in the other case argued that day, Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct.
2726 (2015)—a significant challenge to Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol—
were also arguing before the Court for the first time.
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liam Peterson, came to his argument: a phone call from Justice
Scalia, asking Peterson if he would accept an appointment to
defend the judgment of the Fifth Circuit in a case the Court had
just agreed to hear, and in which the federal government
agreed with the petitioner that the Fifth Circuit had erred.3
Amicus invitations4 of this sort—which generally arise
when one party to a case declines either to participate at all, or
to take a particular position, before the Court—come about
once each Term.5  Although they share a name with the more
common, uninvited amicus filings the Court now receives in
conjunction with the majority of the cases it considers on the
merits,6 they are quite distinct from those better-known unso-
licited filings: they originate with the Court, they direct the
recipient of the invitation to take a particular position,7 and
they are always paired with the right to present oral argument.8
The Court keeps no official records of such invitations,9
and its rules do not reference them.  Similarly, there is no
official guidance on when the Court will invite such an amicus,
whom it will invite, how it makes its selections, or the precise
nature of the amicus’s mandate.10  Although these invitations
3 Miriam Rozen, Lawyer Picked to Defend Fifth Circuit Ruling at SCOTUS,
TEXAS LAWYER, Jan. 26, 2015; see Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015).
4 The Court appears to use the terms “invitation” and “appointment” inter-
changeably in its orders and occasional other references to the practice, so I use
both terms throughout this piece.
5 As the Appendix shows, there have been 58 amicus appointments since
1954 (and one much earlier appointment from 1926), for a rate of approximately
one per year.  There has, however, been a significant increase in frequency in
recent years. See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. R
6 See Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV.
1757, 1768 (2014) (detailing the “dramatic increase” in amicus filings in the
Supreme Court); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-
Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 35 (2011) (noting that amicus briefs “are now
filed in virtually every case” before the Supreme Court).
7 As we shall see, however, the precise role of the advocate vis-a`-vis possible
arguments and outcomes—put differently, the identity of the client—is in many
ways indeterminate. See infra subpart III.B.
8 The Court has explained that it issues such invitations in order to permit it
“to decide the case satisfied that the relevant issues have been fully aired.” Clay v.
United States, 537 U.S. 522, 526 n.2 (2003) (describing invitation of amicus David
DeBruin to present argument in favor of the Seventh Circuit’s judgment, which
the United States had joined the petitioner in attacking); see also STEPHEN SHAPIRO
ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 760 (10th ed. 2013) [hereinafter STERN & GRESS-
MAN] (discussing the Court’s appointment practices).
9 See Email from Supreme Court Public Information Office to author (Oct. 6,
2015,12:23 PM EDT) (on file with author).
10 By contrast, the Court provides at least some guidance to ordinary amicus
filers. See SUP. CT. R. 37.
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have gone largely unnoticed in the scholarship,11 they occur at
the intersection of two important recent critiques of the Court:
first, the increasing dominance of Supreme Court practice by a
small, elite cadre of specialized lawyers;12 and second, the
Court’s status as perhaps the least transparent institution in
American public life.13
This Essay investigates five primary questions (and several
nested subsidiary questions) related to the practice of amicus
invitations.  First, as a descriptive matter, who are the advo-
cates the Court invites to argue before it?  It is well known (at
least in Washington circles) that they are typically elite lawyers
and often former Supreme Court law clerks, but this Essay
attempts to answer the question in more granular detail: spe-
cifically, what sorts of backgrounds do these advocates share,
what types of connections to the Court and to individual Jus-
tices is it possible to discern, and what patterns and trends
emerge from examining the available data?
Second, how does the Court select these advocates from
among the 250,000-plus members of the Supreme Court
bar?14  That is, what do we know or can we discover about the
process by which these advocates are chosen?
Third, what are the implications of these invitations—for
the invited attorneys, the cases in which they participate, the
legal profession as a whole, and perhaps even the law more
broadly?  In terms both narrow and broad, what does the Court
get from the attorneys it invites to argue before it, and what
does it give in return?
Fourth, what can examining this process tell us about the
Court as an institution?  Is this a story of elite reproduction
and insularity or a more complex narrative about potential
disruption and diffusion?  If the act of amicus invitation can
only be evaluated in the context of “the standards of appropri-
ate decisionmaking . . . within the particular institution,”15
11 The one major exception is Brian P. Goldman’s excellent student Note,
Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower
Court Decisions?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 907 (2011). See infra notes 59-61 and accom- R
panying text.
12 See infra notes 18–42 and accompanying text. R
13 See infra notes 43–57 and accompanying text. R
14 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1491 (noting that the requirements for member- R
ship in the Supreme Court bar merely consist of “three years as a practicing
lawyer admitted to any bar of any state, a certificate of good standing from that
bar, sponsorship by two current members of the bar, and a $200 check payable to
the Court”).
15 Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy,
111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1393 (2013).
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what standards can we discern that might help us evaluate the
Court’s track record in this sphere?
Finally, if the practice is in certain respects troubling—and
I argue here that it is—are there potential modifications the
Court should consider?
There is no question that the practice identified here is a
discrete one.  How the Court decides who gets to brief and
argue cases before it—in particular an aspect of a case no party
wishes to pursue—isn’t as pressing a concern as what cases
the Court takes, or what rules it sets forth.  But these invita-
tions do not occur wholly independent of the Court’s case selec-
tion and decisional processes.  And, perhaps more important,
institutional design choices of this sort can both reflect and
instantiate important values, and the Court’s behavior in this
narrow sphere may shed light on the institution much more
broadly.
This Essay begins by situating the Court’s amicus invita-
tions in the context of recent discourse on the rise and increas-
ing prominence of the elite Supreme Court bar; it then surveys
important recent critiques of the reflexive lack of transparency
that in many ways characterizes the contemporary Supreme
Court.
It then turns to a close examination of the process of ami-
cus invitation, drawing on public reporting on the practice,
briefs, oral argument transcripts and audio, and archival re-
search.  It next introduces the Essay’s key descriptive findings,
the results of a comprehensive review of every Supreme Court
amicus appointment I could locate, beginning in 1926:16 it
16 For this review, I ran a number of different Westlaw searches (including
“invit! /s amic!” and “appoint /s amic!”), then excluded invitations to the Solicitor
General and other government entities, as well as denials of requests to appoint
amici.  I then cross-checked those results against every relevant secondary source
in which I found any discussion of the practice or particular invitations. See, e.g.,
Goldman, supra note 11 (compiling and analyzing the Court’s amicus invitations R
before 2011—though I include in my dataset several cases that Goldman ex-
cludes); STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 8, at 760, 770-71 (describing such ap- R
pointments and supplying examples).
It remains possible that cases in which the Court did not issue a formal order
and cases before systematic records were kept—either at all or of such orders, see
Richard J. Lazarus, The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 540, 590 (2014) (noting informality of record-keeping at the early Supreme
Court)—were not captured by these searches.  In addition, I have not included in
the dataset cases in which an amicus was granted leave to participate in a case
following a request by the amicus; this is because such participation is initiated
by the outside party, rather than the Court itself.  For examples of this sort of
amicus participation, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
582 (1952) (“By special leave of Court, Arthur J. Goldberg argued the cause for the
United Steelworkers of America, C.I.O., as amicus curiae.”); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v.
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highlights demographic data and trends, then describes the
backgrounds of the advocates and their relationships to the
Justices.  My findings are at once predictable and surprising:
although demographic data suggest that invitee diversity lags
behind diversity at the Court more broadly and trend lines
suggest that recent amicus invitations invariably go to former
law clerks of the Justices, the Justices do appear increasingly
willing to depart from the norm of prior experience with Su-
preme Court advocacy; indeed, a majority of recent invitations
have gone to attorneys with no previous Supreme Court argu-
ments.  This suggests, I argue, that the practice might hold out
the promise of disrupting, at least to a degree, the increasing
dominance of Supreme Court practice by a small group of ex-
pert practitioners.
After describing these findings, the Essay takes a step back
and identifies a number of themes and dynamics that emerge
from examining the data, including the nature of the role, the
potential impact of the practice on both the legal profession
and the path of the law, and the question of diversity.  The
Essay concludes with a discussion of the normative implica-
tions of the preceding discussion, identifying a series of recom-
mendations for improving the process of amicus invitation.
I
FRAMING THE PRACTICE OF AMICUS INVITATION
This section briefly surveys the literature on two important
dynamics at the contemporary Supreme Court, both of which
provide context for the practice of amicus invitation: first, the
increasing dominance of Supreme Court practice by a small,
elite group of specialized lawyers;17 and second, the persis-
tence at the Court of a degree of non-transparency that would
be unthinkable in any other organ of government.  The section
then describes the existing academic commentary on the prac-
tice of amicus appointment.
Linkline, 555 U.S. 1029, 1029 (2008) (“Motion of American Antitrust Institute for
leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument
granted . . . .”).
17 I should note that the scholarly interest in the Supreme Court bar is a very
recent development; as recently as 2008, Richard Lazarus wrote that, despite the
significant attention paid to the substance of the Court’s work, “wholly absent . . .
from . . . media scrutiny and scholarly commentary is any recognition of the
significance for the Supreme Court and the nation’s laws, of the identity of the
advocates” who both petition and appear before the Court.  Lazarus, supra note 1, R
at 1488.
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A. The Expert Bar
Over the past three decades, Supreme Court practice has
become an increasingly specialized enterprise.18  A Supreme
Court argument is no longer an experience that top advocates
enjoy once or twice in a career, but something a small group
engages in on a routine basis.  While in 1980, approximately
80% of Supreme Court advocates were arguing before the
Court for the first time,19 by 2002, that number was down to
55%,20 and by 2007 it was just 43%.21  During this same time
frame, while the percentage of first-time advocates was nearly
halved, the percentage of very experienced oral advocates—
those with ten or more prior arguments—skyrocketed, increas-
ing 14-fold from just 2% in 1980 to 28% in 2007.22  Even in just
the past two decades, the change has been striking: as a recent
Reuters investigation revealed, over the last ten years, eight
lawyers have presented nearly 20% of oral arguments before
the Court, compared to thirty attorneys holding the same share
in the preceding decade.23
The Supreme Court bar looked like this once before: follow-
ing an 1812 rule change limiting oral argument before the
Court to only two lawyers for each side,24 “a few extraordinary
attorneys dominated oral argument before the Court,”25 in-
cluding household names like Daniel Webster.26  In the 1814
Term, just one of those advocates, Thomas Pinckney, appeared
in over half of the cases decided by the Court.27
18 I refer here to the private Supreme Court bar; Supreme Court practice on
behalf of the federal government has long been highly specialized. See Drew S.
Days III, In Search of the Solicitor General’s Clients: A Drama with Many Charac-
ters, 83 KY. L.J. 485, 486–89 (1995); Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government:
Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 595, 596–97 (1986).
19 John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme
Court Bar, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 75 (2005).
20 Id. Richard Lazarus puts the 1980 figures slightly lower at 76%.  Lazarus,
supra note 1, at 1520.
21 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1520.
22 Id.
23 Biskupic et al., supra note 1.  Many of the most significant findings of this R
investigative report concern the Court’s certiorari practice and the increasing
success of expert Supreme Court practitioners in persuading the Justices to grant
cert in their cases; to take one example, the report found that just sixty-six elite
lawyers were responsible for 43% of granted cert petitions during the period of the
study. Id.
24 David C. Frederick, Supreme Court Advocacy in the Early Nineteenth Cen-
tury, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1, 4 (2005).
25 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1489. R
26 Frederick, supra note 24, at 4; see also KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME R
COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 14 (1993).
27 Frederick, supra note 24, at 8. R
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That first elite Supreme Court bar was at least in part a
function of geography: the challenges of long-distance travel
restricted the pool of regular advocates to attorneys who re-
sided in or near Washington, D.C.28  But “as travel became
easier, the Supreme Court Bar naturally and gradually lost its
cohesiveness by the latter-half of the nineteenth century.”29
For the next century, Supreme Court practice was for the most
part diffuse and decentralized, with most arguments presented
by one-time Supreme Court advocates who followed a single
case all the way up.30  Indeed, in 1986 Justice Rehnquist was
reported to have observed that “there is no . . . Supreme Court
bar at the present time.”31
Beginning in the 1980s, things began to change.  In a se-
ries of articles on the emergence and implications of today’s
elite Supreme Court bar, Richard Lazarus traces the current
state of affairs to Reagan Solicitor General Rex Lee’s 1985 move
from government to Sidley & Austin, where Lee quickly estab-
lished a thriving Supreme Court practice.32  As Lazarus re-
counts, a number of other top law firms quickly followed in
Sidley’s footsteps, hiring other experienced attorneys away
from the Solicitor General’s Office in order to create their own
Supreme Court groups.33
These specialized Supreme Court practices quickly came to
dominate the Court’s docket.  Lazarus focuses on the Court’s
certiorari jurisdiction, noting that with the shrinking of the
Court’s docket,34 expert practitioners have come to file the ma-
jority of successful petitions for certiorari.  While in 1980, ex-
28 MCGUIRE, supra note 26, at 13. R
29 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1492; see also MCGUIRE, supra note 26, at 21 R
(“[T]he postbellum Court marked the end of the integrated Supreme Court bar.”).
30 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1492 (“Most lawyers with Supreme Court cases R
were newcomers, most likely arguing for the first time.  But in no event was there
a discrete, coherent group of private lawyers dominating the cases before the
Court, capable of boasting a sustained, continuous Supreme Court practice.”).
31 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1497 (citing Tony Mauro, Appealing Practice, R
LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at 14).
32 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1498–99. R
33 Id. Although Lazarus’s primary focus is on law firms, he also notes two
additional relevant sites of emerging expertise: new or newly invigorated state
solicitor general’s offices and the creation of Supreme Court clinics at a number of
top law schools. Id. at 1501–02; see also Jeffrey L. Fisher, A Clinic’s Place in the
Supreme Court Bar, 65 STAN. L. REV. 137, 142–50 (2013); Symposium, The Rise of
Appellate Litigators and State Solicitors General, 29 REV. LITIG. 545, 635–45
(2010).
34 See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s
Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1228–34 (2012); J. Harvie Wilkin-
son III, If it Ain’t Broke . . ., 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 67, 67–68 (2010), http://
www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/840_egpccc2c.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZW8-X72U];
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pert Supreme Court practitioners—a group Lazarus defines as
including any attorney who “either him- or herself presented at
least five oral arguments before the Court or is affiliated with a
law firm or other comparable organization with attorneys who
have, in the aggregate, argued at least ten times before the
Court”35—were responsible for less than 6% of successful cert
petitions, in 2007 the number was nearly 54%.36  And the ex-
pert bar is not only successful at obtaining Supreme Court
review; rather, at the merits stage as well, “whether counsel in
a Supreme Court case is an experienced Supreme Court advo-
cate is a significant determinant in the outcome of the case,
even holding everything else equal.”37
Lazarus’s work highlights the troubling implications of the
emergence of this elite Supreme Court bar: in particular, the
fact that the experience and talents of its members are dispro-
portionately deployed in the service of business interests.
There is considerable evidence that this asymmetry confers on
business interests a decided “advocacy advantage: a Supreme
Court docket and rulings on the merits more responsive to
their economic concerns.”38
Although Lazarus is careful to note that there is nothing
inherently problematic about a specialized Supreme Court
bar,39 the troubling distributional consequences of the story he
tells are impossible to miss.  And the threats posed by the
existence of this sort of elite bar may not be limited to the
distortion of outcomes in particular cases.  Rather, in the
words of former appeals court judge Michael Luttig, the emer-
gence of this “narrow group of elite justices and elite counsel
talking to each other,” may result in both a Court and a bar
that are “detached and isolated from the real world, ultimately
at the price of the healthy and proper development of the
law.”40
It is striking, then, that the Justices of the current Court
appear entirely untroubled by these developments.  To the con-
trary: the recent Reuters team investigating the Supreme Court
David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-
Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 152–53 (2010).
35 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1502. R
36 Id. at 1516–17.
37 Id. at 1544; see also Kevin T. McGuire, Repeat Players in the Supreme
Court: The Role of Experienced Lawyers in Litigation Success, 57 J. POL. 187,
192–94 (1995).
38 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1554. R
39 Id.  (“As a general matter, the promotion of more effective advocacy both
before and within the Court should be considered a positive development.”).
40 Biskupic et al., supra note 1. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-6\CRN603.txt unknown Seq: 10 19-SEP-16 16:14
1542 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1533
bar interviewed eight of the nine sitting Justices, and the views
they expressed ranged from sanguine to genuinely enthusiastic
about the shrinking and increasingly elite Supreme Court bar.
According to the report’s authors, “[t]o the [Justices], having
experienced lawyers handling cases helps the court and comes
without any significant cost.  Effective representation, not
broad diversity among counsel, best serves the interests of
justice.”41
Indeed, when asked, during a recent public appearance,
about the transformation of the Supreme Court bar, Justice
Kagan responded:
I think the advocates who appear before us do a fantastic job.
I mean there’s been—one of the things that has happened
over the last twenty years or so at the Supreme Court is the
development of a kind of “Supreme Court bar”—people who
are repeat players, and who have been there before, and who
know what the whole enterprise is about, know the way we
think, know the kinds of questions we ask, know the kinds of
things that matter to us as we reach a decision.  And I think
it’s an unqualified good for the Court. . . .  [I]n general the
level of advocacy is so excellent that sometimes when you see
the opposite—when you see the people who you know might
be good lawyers but in a different venue and sort of don’t get
the kinds of questions that we ask, the kinds of issues that
interest us and concern us and make us rule one way or the
other way—it can be very frustrating.42
B. Transparency
The Supreme Court is one of the least transparent institu-
tions in American public life.  Many aspects of Supreme Court
opacity are widely known and entirely uncontroversial: the
Court’s deliberations about pending cases, for example, neces-
sarily occur free from any sort of public scrutiny.  Other strains
of Supreme Court non-transparency, like the Court’s prohibi-
tion on cameras in the courtroom, are subject to ongoing de-
bate and periodic demands for greater openness.43  But still
41 Id.
42 A Conversation with Elena Kagan, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL
FACULTY PODCAST (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/audio/conversa-
tion-elena-kagan [https://perma.cc/8GQF-UR7U].
43 See, e.g., Lisa T. McElroy, Cameras at the Supreme Court: A Rhetorical
Analysis, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1837, 1842–45 (2012) (“The majority of Americans
think that the press should be able to broadcast audio and video of activities at
the Supreme Court.”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT
317 (2015) (“[I]t is inexplicable and inexcusable that Supreme Court proceedings
are not broadcast live.”).
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other strains of non-transparency at the Court appear uncon-
troversial not because there is consensus that they are neces-
sary or appropriate, but because the public is for the most part
unaware that they even exist.44  The Court’s amicus invitations
fall squarely in the third category.
While the Supreme Court has never been an especially
transparent institution,45 its opacity has come to appear in-
creasingly anachronistic in recent years.  As waves of reform
have opened the workings of other branches of government to
at least a degree of public scrutiny,46 the Court has remained
44 In a very loose sense, this phenomenon bears a certain resemblance to
David Pozen’s conception of “deep secrets” (popularized by Donald Rumsfeld as
“unknown unknowns”)—things “we do not know we do not know.” See David E.
Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 260 (2010).
45 Peter G. Fish, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: Judicial Indiscretion and
Reconstruction Politics, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 225, 225–26 (1967).
46 These reform efforts have resulted in several major pieces of federal legisla-
tion (with state analogues, some of which reach more broadly than their federal
counterparts, see Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62
ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 642–43 (2010)) designed generally to promote greater trans-
parency in government.  Chief among these federal enactments is the notice-and-
comment process set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L.
No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.), which mandates public notice of proposed rules, provides a mechanism
for public comment, and requires agencies to provide explanations for final rules.
In addition, the Freedom of Information Act, first enacted in 1966, provides for
broad public access, subject to a number of exceptions, to the records of federal
agencies.  5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (codified as amended by the Open Government
Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (2007)).  The Government in the
Sunshine Act imposes public meeting and other transparency obligations on gov-
ernment.  Pub. L. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).  Other federal laws aimed at
increasing transparency include the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C.
app. 2 (1972), which “aims to keep Congress and the public informed about the
number, purpose, membership, and activities of groups established or utilized to
offer advice or recommendations to the President or to officers or employees of the
federal government,” Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory
Committee Act and Good Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 452 (1997), and,
more recently, the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act, which
mandates collection and dissemination of information on government contracts,
loans, and grants, Pub. L. No. 109-282, § 2, 120 Stat. 1186, 1187 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 6101 (2006)).  Beyond these legislative enactments, a
number of executive-branch initiatives in recent years promise increased open-
ness and transparency, event absent legislative mandates.  These include a presi-
dential memorandum directing federal agencies to take steps to increase
transparency, see Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment
[https://perma.cc/S74B-NA86]; a follow-on series of “Open Government” plans
promulgated by federal agencies, THE WHITE HOUSE, THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S
COMMITMENT TO OPEN GOVERNMENT: STATUS REPORT 1 (2011), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/opengov_report.pdf, [https://perma.cc/
47UR-PFJF]; and the launch of “Data.gov,” “the landmark Obama initiative that
requires agencies to place online ‘high-value’ datasets of their choice,”  Jennifer
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firmly committed, both in its practice and in statements by the
Justices,47 to conducting much of its business in secret48—
including aspects of its business around which there is argua-
bly no genuine or compelling need for secrecy.
In recent years, scholars have increasingly turned their
attention to aspects of Supreme Court practice that appear
driven by habits or reflexes of secrecy and are unrelated to—
perhaps even antithetical to—imperatives of rigor and integrity
in the Court’s decisional processes.  An important new addition
to the discourse on transparency and the Court is Richard
Lazarus’s The (Non)Finality of Supreme Court Opinions49—a
ground-breaking examination of the Court’s practice of revising
its slip opinions well after their initial release.  As Lazarus’s
piece demonstrates, the consequences of the Court’s non-
transparent revision process have in some cases been signifi-
cant.  In one example, a revision to the initial language in a
concurrence by Justice Rehnquist subsequently became im-
portant language in the majority opinion in United States v.
Lopez, which effectively upended much of the Court’s Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence.50  In another example, doctrinally
significant language from Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Lawrence v. Texas was subsequently excised from the opinion,
but not before it had been cited extensively by scholars and
lower courts.51  In addition to the implications of these specific
examples, Lazarus argues that the practice risks creating con-
fusion about the state of the law, particularly during the period
between the Court’s release of its initial slip opinions and the
Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the United
States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 81 (2012).
47 See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 313
(1955) (“The secrecy that envelops the Court’s work is not due to love of secrecy or
want of responsible regard for the claims of a democratic society to know how it is
governed.  That the Supreme Court should not be amenable to the forces of
publicity to which the Executive and the Congress are subjected is essential to the
effective functioning of the Court.”).
48 Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Princi-
ples, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (“[T]he Court operates outside of the public eye
and under a cloak of secrecy.”).  For a discussion of the law clerk code of conduct,
which imposes confidentiality obligations on law clerks, see ARTEMUS WARD &
DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 16–17 (2006).  Ward and Weiden cite the 1989 code of
conduct, available in Justice Blackmun’s papers; no later version of the code is
publicly available.
49 Lazarus, supra note 16. R
50 Lazarus, supra note 16, at 595–96 (discussing Hodel v. Virginia Surface R
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 313 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring)).
51 Id. at 599–601.
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final published opinions (a period that at present averages
about five years), and may undermine confidence in the integ-
rity of the Court’s written opinions.52
Other scholars have advanced proposals for injecting a de-
gree of openness into the Court’s workings.  Kathryn Watts, for
example, proposes applying core administrative-law principles
to the Court’s certiorari process.  She offers a two-fold proposal
for improving accountability and promoting public participa-
tion in the Court’s exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction: first, a
requirement that the Justices disclose their votes on cert peti-
tions;53 and second, “through greater invited and uninvited
amicus curiae participation” at the cert stage.54  Carolyn Sha-
piro suggests that the Court consider “publicly shar[ing] more
information about the reasons it does or does not grant cert in
particular cases.”55 One recent proposal, by Michael
Abramowicz & Thomas Colby, goes much further, suggesting
that the Justices solicit feedback from the public on draft opin-
ions before those opinions become final, enabling the Court to
harness the “wisdom of crowds” and avoid the errors a secret
drafting process is bound at times to produce.56  And a recent
piece by William Baude highlights the relative lack of rigor and
transparency in what Baude terms the Court’s “shadow
docket,” by which he means primarily orders granting or deny-
ing requests for stays or injunctions, and summary reversals;
Baude argues that in these cases the Court should adopt some
of the procedural regularity and reason-giving that characterize
its ordinary consideration of merits cases.57
As this body of scholarship makes clear, the Court’s ap-
pointment practices are embedded within an institutional con-
52 Id. at 611–12.
53 Watts, supra note 48, at 57 (“[V]ote-disclosure requirements offer a promis- R
ing mechanism to increase transparency and improve public monitoring of the
Court.”); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections
Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1645–48
(2000) (raising questions about the desirability of a Supreme Court with essen-
tially unconstrained power to set its own agenda).
54 Watts, supra note 48, at 62.  Less relevant to this project, she also suggests R
that lower courts reinvigorate the practice of “certification” of particular questions
to the Supreme Court. Id. at 67–68; see also Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Su-
preme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1310, 1319–25 (2010) (arguing for a revival of certification by the courts of
appeals).
55 Carolyn Shapiro, The Law Clerk Proxy Wars: Secrecy, Accountability, and
Ideology in the Supreme Court, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101, 125 (2009).
56 Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 966–67 (2009).
57 William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 1–5, 9–15 (2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-6\CRN603.txt unknown Seq: 14 19-SEP-16 16:14
1546 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1533
text characterized by a reflexive lack of transparency—entirely
necessary in certain spheres, but far less so in others.
C. The Existing Commentary
Given the manifest interest in both Supreme Court advo-
cacy and transparency at the Court, the practice of amicus
invitation has been the subject of surprisingly little scholarly
attention.58  The few scholars who have addressed the topic
have focused on its substantive permissibility, on either consti-
tutional or policy grounds.  But no one has yet trained a lens on
either the process of amicus selection or its results.
In the most comprehensive treatment of the practice to
date, Brian P. Goldman offers a useful taxonomy of the types of
amicus appointments the Court makes, concluding that they
can be divided into four broad categories: (1) “cases in which
the respondent confessed error and reversed its prior position
on the merits,” (2) “cases in which the judgment below rested
on grounds raised sua sponte by the lower court, which neither
party supported,” (3) “cases in which it was not the decision
below that was unrepresented, but instead a specific position
the Court wanted argued,” and (4) “cases in which the respon-
dent simply failed to enter a proper appearance before the
Court.”59  Goldman further divides these categories into several
sub-categories, offering general objections to some such invita-
tions, and defenses of others.  In broad terms, he argues that
invitations to address jurisdictional questions are necessary
and appropriate; conversely, he labels unjustified or imprudent
any instance in which the Court injects into the proceedings
non-jurisdictional arguments the parties have chosen not to
present, or where by appointing an amicus the Court revives a
case that would otherwise have been mooted.60  He contends
that where the Court uses an amicus to “reach[ ] out to make
pronouncements of law and set nationwide precedent on ques-
tions that are not properly before it,” the practice may actually
“undermine[ ] the perceived neutrality and legitimacy upon
which [the Court’s] authority depends.”61
58 Henry Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 692 n.149 (2012) (calling the writing on the
subject “sparse”).
59 Goldman, supra note 11, at 918. R
60 Id. at 969–70.
61 Id. at 912.
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Henry Monaghan similarly suggests in passing that some
amicus appointments may raise genuine Article III concerns,62
though he quickly concludes that “the practice is now too
deeply ingrained to be overthrown.”63  Still, his discomfort is
evident: “Insofar as the Court has expanded its ability to have
the final say on any constitutional question capable of judicial
resolution, the result seems to be consistent with its current
place in our constitutional order . . . . [T]he Court seeks to
establish an unfettered prerogative over what issues to
decide . . . .”64
Amanda Frost argues that the practice of amicus invita-
tion, though in tension with a broad (if undertheorized) consen-
sus against judicial “issue creation,” is in fact under some
circumstances an appropriate mechanism judges use to en-
gage not just in dispute resolution, but also in law pronounce-
ment.65  And Neal Devins and Saikrishna Prakash, although
deeply critical of judicial requests for legal views from either
parties to a case or arms of the federal government, in passing
exempt amicus invitations, explaining that “[w]hen one or both
parties are unwilling to [argue legal issues that the court identi-
fies as relevant], a court may request amici to file briefs.  In
such circumstances, appointment of amici (a request for legal
advice) helps ensure an adversarial presentation of all legal
issues the court deems pertinent.”66
This Essay examines amicus invitations from an entirely
different perspective.  Rather than focus on the jurisdictional
or quasi-jurisdictional questions that attend the Court’s prac-
tice, I have canvassed every existing amicus invitation, with a
primary focus on the advocates themselves.  Together, the data
provide rich new material for identifying and assessing impor-
tant dynamics on the contemporary Supreme Court.
62 Monaghan, supra note 58, at 707 (“Injecting issues does . . . present addi- R
tional Article III problems, since the Court is now fashioning rules concerning
matters beyond those provided by the litigants.  Appointing additional litigants—
amici to ‘support or defend the judgment below’—certainly takes yet another step
beyond, at least in the cases when no actual litigant wants to support the judg-
ment, as opposed to instances in which the litigant cannot proceed.”).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 730.
65 Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 465–67, 516–17
(2009).
66 Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, Essay, Reverse Advisory Opinions, 80
U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 889 (2013).
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II
FINDINGS
The preceding sections provide context for the Supreme
Court’s amicus invitation process.  I turn now to a description
of the results of that process.  I begin with an overview, then
present some of the key results of my examination of every
recorded amicus appointment of which I could locate any
record.
A. Overview
Approximately once each Term—with a notable increase in
frequency in recent years67—the Court appoints an amicus
curiae when one party to a case declines to participate at all, or
to advance a particular argument, in a case pending before the
Court.68  As the Court has explained, it typically makes such
an appointment in order to permit it “to decide the case satis-
fied that the relevant issues have been fully aired.”69  Beyond
such general statements in its opinions, however, the Court
provides no information to the public or the Supreme Court bar
about the circumstances under which it will appoint an amicus
or how it decides whom to appoint.  Nor do its rules reference
such appointments.  Stern and Gressman provide only a gen-
eral description of the practice, writing, “The Court on occasion
may appoint or invite an attorney to brief and argue a case
67 See Appendix.
68 In addition to these amicus appointments, the Court makes use of outside
attorneys in several other capacities.  First, it appoints “Special Masters” to func-
tion as judicial adjuncts in original actions filed in the Court. See Anne-Marie C.
Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the
Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 641–58 (2002).
Second, on a number of occasions, it has appointed outside counsel when an
unrepresented in forma pauperis (IFP) party who successfully petitions the Court
for certiorari requests such an appointment (or when the Court chooses to make
such an appointment even absent a request).  Perhaps the most famous such
appointment was the Court’s selection of Abe Fortas to represent Clarence Gideon
in the case that became Gideon v. Wainwright. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S
TRUMPET 49, 54 (1989); see also Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 520 (2004)
(“Seth P. Waxman, by appointment of the Court, 538 U.S. 997, argued the cause
for petitioner.”); United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1774 (1993) (“Carter G.
Phillips, Washington D.C., appointed by this Court, argued for respondent.”).  It
appears, however, that with the rise of the specialized Supreme Court bar and the
attendant close monitoring of the Court’s docket, any IFP party who manages to
persuade the Court to grant cert will immediately receive offers of pro bono repre-
sentation, so that such appointments very rarely arise today.
69 Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 526 n.2 (2003).
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pending before it as amicus curiae ‘in support of the petitioner’
or ‘in support of the judgment below.’”70
The first amicus appointment of which there is any record
arose in connection with the Court’s consideration of the 1926
presidential power case Myers v. United States.71 Myers in-
volved a statute that required the President to obtain Senate
consent before removing a postmaster.72  The President, after
concluding that the statute was unconstitutional, removed a
postmaster without first seeking Senate consent;73 the post-
master challenged his removal, and the executive branch ar-
gued against the statute’s constitutionality.74  Myers’ counsel,
William King, defended the statute’s constitutionality, but after
King twice failed to appear at the Court for oral argument, the
Court appointed Pennsylvania Senator George Pepper to de-
fend the statute as amicus curiae.75
The Court ultimately sided with the President, concluding
that the power to remove executive officers was his alone.76
But it ended its opinion with an expression of appreciation to
Pepper for his advocacy of the opposing position:
Before closing this opinion we wish to express the obligation
of the court to Mr. Pepper for his able brief and argument as a
friend of the court.  Undertaken at our request, our obligation
is none the less if we find ourselves obliged to take a view
adverse to his.  The strong presentation of arguments against
the conclusion of the Court is of the utmost value in enabling
the Court to satisfy itself that it has fully considered all that
can be said.77
After its amicus appointment in Myers, the Court went
several decades without another appointment—along the way
70 STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 8, at 760.  The authors continue: “Since the R
Court accepts a case for oral argument because it presents issues of importance
to the public, and not merely to the parties, it wants the benefit of argument by
skilled counsel on both sides, and not merely one side, before it reaches its
decision.” Id.
71 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
72 Id. at 106–07.
73 Id. at 107–08.
74 Myers v. United States, 58 Ct. Cl. 199, 203 (Ct. Cl. 1923).
75 Myers, 272 U.S. at 176; see also Saikrishna Prakash, The Story of Myers
and Its Wayward Successors: Going Postal on the Removal Power, in PRESIDENTIAL
POWER STORIES 165, 169–77 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds.,
2009) (describing the litigation).  Pepper filed a brief, Brief for the Appellant Filed
by George Wharton Pepper, Amicus Curiae, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1924) (No. 77), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 69-174, at 109, 113 (1926), and also
presented oral argument before the Court.  Prakash, supra note 75, at 172–73,
176; see also President’s Rights Before High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1925, at 2.
76 Myers, 272 U.S. at 176.
77 Id. at 176–77.
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ruling on cases in which the decision not to appoint an amicus
was striking.  In the 1939 case United States v. Miller,78 the
most important decision on the Second Amendment until
2008,79 the Court did not appoint an amicus, although the
attorney for defendants Miller and Layton (whose firearms in-
dictments had been quashed below based on the Second
Amendment) did not file a brief or appear for oral arguments,
and had informed the Court in advance that he would not.80
Still, the Court did not appoint an amicus to defend the judg-
ment below or to develop the Second Amendment claim—and
accordingly heard argument from only the government.81  And
in the 1942 case Young v. United States, the Court decided the
merits of a challenge to a physician’s conviction, although the
government agreed that the conviction should be reversed and
no amicus argued in defense of the conviction; indeed, the
Court took pains to explain that a confession of error “does not
relieve this Court of the performance of the judicial function.”82
After Myers, the Court’s next amicus appointment came in
1954, when the Court invited Harvard Law School Dean Erwin
Griswold to argue in support of a Third Circuit judgment af-
firming the dismissal of a divorce action and upholding the
domicile requirement of a Virgin Islands divorce statute.83  The
spouses in the case, though nominally adversaries, agreed that
the domicile requirement was unlawful, and so the Court ap-
pointed Griswold to defend it.84  The papers in the case, Gran-
78 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
79 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
80 Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3. N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 48, 60, 66–67 (2008).
81 Indeed, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller placed some reliance on
the one-sidedness of the Miller argument. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 623 (“The
defendants made no appearance in the case, neither filing a brief nor appearing at
oral argument; the Court heard from no one but the Government (reason enough,
one would think, not to make that case the beginning and the end of this Court’s
consideration of the Second Amendment).”).  For more detail on the procedural
history of Miller, see Frye, supra note 80, at 67 (noting that in the Supreme Court, R
“no one represented Miller or Layton”); cf.  Maryland v. Dyson 527 U.S. 465, 468
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause respondent’s counsel is not a member of
this Court’s bar and did not wish to become one, respondent has not filed a brief
in opposition to the petition for certiorari.  I believe we should not summarily
reverse in a criminal case, irrespective of the merits, where the respondent is
represented by a counsel unable to file a response, without first inviting an attor-
ney to file a brief as amicus curiae in response to the petition for certiorari.”).
82 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942).
83 348 U.S. 885 (1954) (appointment memo); Granville-Smith v. Granville-
Smith, 214 F.2d 820, 820 (3d Cir. 1954).
84 See Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 4 (1955) (“In view of
the lack of genuine adversary proceedings at any stage in this litigation, the
outcome of which could have far-reaching consequences on domestic relations
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ville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, are sparse, but it appears that
there was some hesitation about appointing an amicus; a No-
vember 1954 memo from Justice Frankfurter to Chief Justice
Warren called the Chief Justice’s attention to “a good illustra-
tion of the duty of a court to have the benefit of informed argu-
ment, particularly in matters that touch closely the institution
of the family.”85  It then offered a lengthy excerpt from an En-
glish case involving an invited amicus, Galloway v. Galloway.86
Evidently this memo had the intended effect; four days later the
Court took the case and invited Dean Griswold “to appear and
present oral argument as amicus curiae in support of the judg-
ment below.”87
After Granville-Smith, the Court settled into the practice of
fairly regular amicus appointments, though it has gone some
long stretches without appointing any amici (for example, there
were no appointments between 1957 and 1968).88  In addition,
the Roberts Court has made an unusually high number of
appointments—19 between 2008 and 2015, for a rate of more
than two appointments per year.89  It is probably too soon to
say whether a new norm of more frequent amicus invitation
has been established, but the post-2008 data are certainly sug-
gestive of such a turn.  In addition to the increasing frequency,
the Court’s first healthcare case, the 2012 case NFIB v. Sebe-
lius,90 featured two separate appointed amici,91 something that
had never previously occurred.
Amicus appointments have figured in some significant
cases, in addition to Myers and NFIB. Bob Jones University v.
United States92 featured the amicus appointment of prominent
attorney William Coleman, who defended the IRS’ revocation of
throughout the United States, the Court invited specially qualified counsel ‘to
appear and present oral argument, as amicus curiae, in support of the judgment
below.’”) (quoting 348 U.S. at 885).
85 Memorandum from Chief Justice Frankfurter to Justice Warren (Nov. 18,
1954) (on file with author).
86 Galloway v. Galloway [1954] P. 312 at 321 (Eng.).  The actual opinion
continues, in a portion not excerpted by Frankfurter, “In the result we have had
the advantage of a full and careful argument of both sides of the question . . . and I
would express my indebtedness to counsel for the help they have given us.”  Id. at
321–22.
87 348 U.S. at 885–86.  The order also denied the parties’ request to submit
the case without oral argument.
88 See Appendix.
89 See Appendix.
90 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
91 132 S. Ct. 609 (2011) (Robert A. Long); 132 S. Ct. 608 (2011) (H. Bartow
Farr).
92 456 U.S. 922 (1982) (appointment memo); 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (the case
itself).
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Bob Jones’ tax-exempt status when DOJ declined to offer a
defense.  In Dickerson v. United States, amicus Paul Cassell
defended 18 U.S.C. § 5301 when the federal government joined
defendant Dickerson in attacking its constitutionality.93  And
when the Court considered the constitutionality of the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA) in United States v. Windsor, appointed
amicus Vicki Jackson presented the Court with an argument
that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the case.94
In addition to the involvement of amici in significant cases,
a number of prominent attorneys first argued before the Court
as appointed amici.  The most striking such example is now-
Chief Justice John Roberts, who was appointed to defend the
judgment below in United States v. Halper 95 while he was still
in private practice at Hogan & Hartson.96  And a number of
other appointed amici have gone on to the federal bench, in-
cluding Fifth Circuit Judge Rhesa Barksdale,97 Second Circuit
Judge Barrington Parker, Jr.,98 Sixth Circuit Judge Jeffrey
Sutton,99 Federal Circuit Judge Richard Taranto,100 and for-
mer Utah District Court Judge Paul Cassell.101
B. Process
How exactly do these amicus appointments come about?
There is no official guidance from the Court, but public report-
ing about such appointments and the papers of the Justices
provide some clues.  What emerges from these sources is a
strong sense that the process is ad hoc and relationship-
driven; that a degree of familiarity with the Court—not neces-
sarily experience arguing before the Court, but familiarity with
its operations, most frequently as a result of a recent clerk-
93 530 U.S. 428, 441–42 (2000).
94 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 (2013).
95 488 U.S. 906 (1988).
96 See John G. Roberts, Senate Judiciary Questionnaire, at 34 (listing Halper
first among Supreme Court arguments); see also Tony Mauro, Supreme Court
Justices Turn to Ex-Clerks for Unusual Role; Former Clerks Tapped to Make the
Arguments Others Have Abandoned, NAT’L L.J., April 14, 2008, http://
www.nationallawjournal.com/id=900005561335/Supreme-Court-Justices-
Turn-to-ExClerks-for-Unusual-Role?slreturn=20160630140803 [https://
perma.cc/3RWW-NTLX] (“When Roberts, following up on Alito’s invitation, called
to tell Jorgensen the Court had approved his appointment, Roberts noted that he
himself had snagged his first argument in similar fashion.”).
97 Thigpen v. Roberts, 464 U.S. 1006 (1983) (appointment memo).
98 New York v. Harris, 492 U.S. 934 (1989) (appointment memo).
99 Hohn v. United States, 522 U.S. 944 (1997) (appointment memo).
100 Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 532 U.S. 917 (2001)
(appointment memo).
101 Dickerson v. United States, 528 U.S. 1045 (1999) (appointment memo).
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ship—has become a near-absolute pre-requisite; and that little
systematic care or attention is typically given to these appoint-
ments, despite their significance to the cases in question, the
careers of the selected attorneys, and sometimes to the path of
the law.
A series of 1982 memos from Chief Justice Burger suc-
cinctly captures these dynamics.  The case at issue was Verlin-
den B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, which presented the
question of whether the jurisdictional grant in the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act was consistent with Article III.102  The
Court granted certiorari in January 1982,103 but months later,
in early October, the Clerk of the Court notified the Chief Jus-
tice that he had received word that counsel for the respondent
“ha[d] been instructed by his client not to proceed further in
this case and hence no brief w[ould] be forthcoming.”104  On
October 28, 1982, the Chief Justice sent a note to the confer-
ence referencing the Clerk’s memo, and elaborating: “I assume
we want to appoint an amicus to argue for the respondent here.
I’ll try to muster up some names from among the Washington
Bar.  I have a former Clerk who was Assistant Legal Adviser at
State and now with Covington and Burling.  I question whether
any of the ‘Big Guns’, e.g., Griswold, et al. are anxious to work
for nothing on a case like this.”105  In a separate memo circu-
lated later that day, following another update from the Clerk,
the Chief Justice proposed what he seemed to view as a clean
resolution: “It now develops that we may have a ‘natural’ for
appointment as amicus.  A former Harlan Clerk, Stephen N.
Shulman[,] . . . has already filed an amicus brief . . . and
perhaps we can ‘anoint’ him.”106  On November 1, the Court
issued an order inviting Shulman to argue the case as amicus
curiae,107 which he did in January 1983.108
The available papers on Bob Jones University v. United
States, which involved the permissibility of the IRS’s decision to
revoke the tax-exempt status of several universities with ra-
102 461 U.S. 480, 482 (1983).
103 454 U.S. 1140 (1982).
104 Memorandum from the Supreme Court Clerk to the Chief Justice (Oct. 8,
1982) (on file with author).
105 Memorandum to the Conference from Chambers of Chief Justice Burger
(Oct. 28, 1982) (on file with author).
106 Memorandum from Chambers of Chief Justice Burger (Oct. 28, 1982) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger on Oct. 28,
1982].
107 459 U.S. 964 (1982) (appointment memo).
108 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 482 (1983).
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cially discriminatory policies,109 are also intriguing, though
less revealing than Verlinden.  The original IRS rule change
occurred in 1971,110 and in 1975 the IRS formally revoked Bob
Jones University’s tax-exempt status.111  Throughout the
lower-court litigation, the federal government defended the IRS’
interpretation of the tax code.  By the time the case was before
the Supreme Court, however, there had been a change in ad-
ministrations, and the Solicitor General’s merits brief sided
with the university, concluding that the statute did not permit
the IRS interpretation that had led to the revocation.112  Ac-
cordingly, the Court decided to appoint an amicus to defend
the IRS and the judgment of the Fourth Circuit.
Although I found no explicit request to this effect in the
Justices’ Bob Jones files, at some point Chief Justice Burger
evidently asked the Conference for possible names, and on
April 8, 1982, Justice Marshall sent a memo in response.  It
read: “I have been doing some more thinking about the ap-
pointment of counsel in the above cases.  I have ended up by
suggesting that we appoint William T. Coleman.  It would ap-
pear to me that he has all of the qualifications.”113  Coleman, a
prominent DC attorney who had been the first African Ameri-
can law clerk on the Supreme Court,114 had, among other
things, spent time early in his career working with Marshall at
the NAACP LDF, appearing with Marshall on one of the
NAACP’s briefs in Brown v. Board of Education.115
The day after Marshall’s memo, Chief Justice Burger circu-
lated a memo to the Conference listing six suggestions he had
apparently received: it contained, in addition to Coleman, the
names of Erwin Griswold, Lloyd Cutler, Bernard G. Segal,
Philip Tone, and Robert Landis.116  It then noted, “We can dis-
109 461 U.S. 574, 577–79 (1983).
110 See IRS Rev. Rule 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
111 Olatunde Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University v. United States:
Race, Religion, and Congress’ Extraordinary Acquiescence 127, 141 in STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION STORIES (Eskridge et al. eds., 2011).
112 Brief for the United States at 11–12, Bob Jones University v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1 and 81-3).
113 Memorandum to the Chief Justice, cc to the Conference, from Justice
Marshall (April 8, 1982) (on file with author).
114 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Man in the News; No Stranger to the High Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1982, at D21.
115 Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and for Respondents in No. 10 on
Reargument, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), http://www.loc.gov/
exhibits/brown/brown-brown.html [https://perma.cc/HEM6-ZCVH].
116 Memorandum to the Conference from Chief Justice Burger (April 9, 1982)
(on file with author).  The version of the memo in the Warren file has a “No” written
next to the names of both Griswold and Cutler.
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cuss this at the next Conference.”117  Ten days later, the Court
issued an order inviting Coleman to brief and argue the
case.118
These two case files provide intriguing glimpses (limited as
they are) into the Court’s amicus appointments.  And recent
reporting suggests that this ad hoc and relationship-driven
process remains largely unchanged today.  A 2008 piece by
Tony Mauro sheds some light on a more recent amicus ap-
pointment (though from the perspective of the appointed ami-
cus, former Alito clerk Jay Jorgensen, rather than the
Conference).  As Mauro reports, Jorgensen received a phone
call from Justice Alito asking him whether he would accept an
appointment to defend the judgment below in Greenlaw v.
United States, a case in which the Eighth Circuit had sua
sponte extended a defendant’s sentence by fifteen years.119
Jorgensen, a former clerk to then-Judge Alito and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, had never argued before the Court and he “eagerly
agreed.”120  As it turned out, his argument occurred on the
same day as another appointed amicus, former Thomas clerk
Peter Rutledge, who was also arguing before the Court for the
first time.121  Kansas Solicitor General and University of Kan-
sas Law Professor Stephen McAllister, who clerked for Justices
White and Thomas, tells a similar story of receiving a phone
call from Justice Alito asking him if he would accept an ap-
pointment in Bond v. United States.122  For all of these amici—
as with Coleman—a relationship with an individual Justice
appears to have driven the invitation.
C. Invited Amici: What the Data Show
With that largely anecdotal background, this section dis-
cusses my key findings regarding the identities of the individu-
117 Id.
118 456 U.S. 922 (appointment memo).  The choice of Coleman was widely
praised. See, e.g., A True Friend of the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1982, at A22
(calling the selection of Coleman “a brilliant response” to the Reagan Justice
Department’s “shameful” change in policy, and opining that the appointment
“assures first-class representation for Americans, black and white, who protest
this tax subsidy”).
119 552 U.S. 1135 (2008) (appointment memo); 554 U.S. 237, 240 (2008) (the
case itself).
120 Mauro, supra note 96.
121 Id.
122 McAllister Tapped for Rare Opportunity to Defend Orphaned Argument at
U.S. Supreme Court, KU LAW MAGAZINE, Spring 2011, at 17, http://issuu.com/
kulaw/docs/ku_law_magazine_sp11 [https://perma.cc/GB9W-XL3C].
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als the Court invites to serve as amici, as well as the outcomes
of the cases in which they are selected to participate.
1. Relationships to the Justices
Forty of the fifty-nine invited amici—approximately 68%—
once served as law clerks to one or more of the Justices.123
This overall figure, however, is somewhat misleading; the gen-
eral practice of inviting former clerks to serve as amici, though
not a new development, has increased dramatically over time.
While three of the Court’s first ten amicus invitations were
issued to former law clerks,124 all of the ten most recent invita-
tions have gone to former clerks.125  Of the first twenty-five
appointments in the dataset, ten were former law clerks to
Supreme Court Justices; of the twenty-five most recent invita-
tions, all twenty-five went to the Justices’ former clerks.126  The
chart below depicts these general trend lines, by decade.
123 For purposes of this figure, and the others in the text, I count as a former
Supreme Court law clerk one individual who clerked for Justice Alito when he was
on the Third Circuit, Jeffrey S. Bucholtz. See Millbrook v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 785 (2012) (appointment memo).
124 Williams v. Georgia, 348 U.S. 957 (1955) (Murphy clerk Eugene Gress-
man); Lambert v. California, 354 U.S. 936 (1957) (Douglas clerk Warren Christo-
pher); Cheng Fan Kwok v. I.N.S., 390 U.S. 918 (1968) (Warren clerk William H.
Dempsey).
125 See Appendix.
126 Though the development is a striking one, it bears noting that for the early
period covered by the dataset, Supreme Court law clerks in many chambers
functioned primarily as legal secretaries; it was only around 1919 that  the posi-
tion began evolving into a full-time research assistant position in some chambers,
see WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 48, at 34–35,  and it took substantially longer in R
many chambers for the change to take hold, see THE FORGOTTEN MEMOIR OF JOHN
KNOX: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT CLERK IN FDR’S WASHINGTON xxi
(Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow eds. 2002).  Still, by the 1970s, the
position had largely assumed its current form, and the norm of appointing prior
clerks did not harden until somewhat later. TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE
MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 31,
174–90 (2006).  So the shift is likely not fully attributable to the change in the
institution of the Supreme Court clerkship. See also infra notes 259-269 and R
accompanying text.
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Clerkships, however, are not the only discernible links be-
tween the Justices and amici; some of the early amici who did
not serve as law clerks had other close relationships to one or
more of the Justices.  For example, the second amicus invita-
tion in the dataset, in 1954,127 went to Dean Griswold, a former
student and close friend of Justice Frankfurter.128  Fifteen
years later, in 1969, Arkansas attorney James Gallman was
invited to argue in defense of a discriminatory recreational fa-
cility in the case Daniel v. Paul;129 although he did not clerk on
the Court, Gallman had worked with Justice Marshall in the
district court litigation in Cooper v. Aaron, when Gallman was
an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Arkansas
and Marshall was at the NAACP.130  Former California Senator
Thomas Kuchel also did not clerk at the Court, but he had been
appointed to the U.S. Senate by then-Governor Earl Warren in
127 Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 348 U.S. 885 (1954) (appointment
memo).
128 Goldman, supra note 11, at 916. R
129 393 U.S. 1061 (1969) (appointment memo).
130 Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220, 221 (E.D. Ark. 1957).  The oral argu-
ment in Daniel v. Paul demonstrates Gallman’s extraordinarily detailed knowledge
of the facility in question and the surrounding region. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 7–9, Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (No. 488), http://
www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1968/1968_488 [http://perma.cc/R9BE-
RCQ8].
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1953;131 though his 1971 amicus invitation came two years
after Warren’s retirement,132 it seems highly likely that the
relationship played a role.
These other relationships, then, seem to have played some
role in a subset of the amicus invitations the Court has made.
The more current paradigm, however, has shifted decisively
from former colleagues or acquaintances of the Justices to for-
mer law clerks—including, as detailed below, law clerks with-
out any prior experience arguing before the Court.133
2. Geography
Geography appears to play a role in a sizable number of
amicus invitations, though by no means all.  Most notably, in a
significant number of cases in the dataset—more than pure
chance would produce—former law clerks to the Justices in
whose circuit of responsibility the case arose have received
invitations.
An overview of the eleven most recent amicus invitations is
illustrative.  Four of the eleven went to individuals who were
former law clerks to the Circuit Justice.  Beginning with the
most recent example, amicus Helgi Walker, who argued in
March 2016, clerked for Justice Thomas, the Circuit Justice for
the Eleventh Circuit, where the case arose.  Richard Bernstein,
who argued in October 2015 in Montgomery v. Louisiana, out of
the Fifth Circuit, is a former law clerk to Justice Scalia, the
former Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit.134  Evan Young,
who also clerked for Justice Scalia, was appointed in 2011 to
argue Setser v. United States, another case out of the Fifth
Circuit.135  And Jeffrey Bucholtz, who argued as amicus in the
2012 case Millbrook v. United States,136 is a former law clerk to
Justice Alito; Justice Alito is the Circuit Justice for the Third
Circuit, where Millbrook arose.
Other appointments may be in part traceable to geography,
but not necessarily in the sense of a clerkship for the Circuit
131 Lawrence E. Davies, Successor to Nixon in Senate is Named: Warren Names
Thomas H. Kuchel As Nixon’s Successor in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1952,
at 1.
132 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 404 U.S. 813 (1971)
(appointment memo).
133 See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About
Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1542 (2010) (describing former
law clerks as key players in media and academic circles, with the power to influ-
ence the Justices).
134 See 135 S. Ct. 1729 (2015) (appointment memo).
135 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1466 (2012).
136 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1442 (2013).
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Justice.  William Peterson, who argued in the spring of 2015 in
defense of a Fifth Circuit judgment, clerked for Justice
Thomas, who was not (though he has subsequently become)137
the Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit; but Peterson had done
an appellate clerkship on the Fifth Circuit and was practicing
in Texas when Justice Scalia called to invite him to defend the
judgment below, so it is entirely possible that geography played
some role.138  And Harvard Law Professor John Manning, who
clerked for Justice Scalia but whose invitation case arose in the
D.C. Circuit,139 for which the Chief Justice rather than Justice
Scalia serves as Circuit Justice, clerked on the D.C. Circuit
(though his appointment seems more likely to have been based
on his expertise as a scholar of administrative law and statu-
tory interpretation).
Others do not appear to satisfy any geographic criterion
(perhaps in part because they served as law clerks to Justices
no longer on the Court).  Again, confining the discussion to the
eleven most recent invitations, Catherine M.A. Carroll, one of
the most recent appointees, is a former law clerk to Justice
Souter;140 Vicki Jackson, who argued one aspect of Windsor, is
a former law clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall;141 James
Feldman, who argued Levin v. United States in 2013, clerked
for Justice William Brennan;142 and H. Bartow Farr and Robert
Long, who each argued an aspect of NFIB v. Sebelius, clerked
for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell, respectively.143
It is entirely possible that the invitations in this last group
were driven by other relationships to the Circuit Justice, but
the public record is silent on that question.  In general, then,
geography appears to be a significant factor in some amicus
invitations, but one that in no way explains all such
invitations.
137 See Circuit Assignments, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://
www.supremecourt.gov/about/circuitAssignments.aspx [https://perma.cc/
X7AD-NP3C] (announcing circuit assignments as of Feb. 25, 2016).
138 Rozen, supra note 3. R
139 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 81 (2012).
140 But Justice Souter was the Circuit Justice for the Tenth Circuit, where
Carroll’s appointment case arose, as is his successor, Justice Sotomayor; it was
Justice Sotomayor’s chambers who called Carroll to invite her to argue. See
Kimberly Robinson, When the Supreme Court Comes Calling: WilmerHale Partner
Invited to Argue Next Term, 84 U.S.L.W. 106, 106 (2015).  From most public
reporting about the practice, it appears to be the Circuit Justice who typically
makes the phone call inviting the amicus to serve.
141 133 S. Ct. 814 (2012).
142 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012).
143 132 S. Ct. 608, 608–09 (2011).
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3. Subject Matter Expertise
Subject matter expertise appears to play a role in some
appointments, although mostly when the amici are academics.
When Dean Griswold was invited to argue in Granville-Smith,
for example, he had recently published an article in the
Harvard Law Review on “the problems raised by nonuniform
state divorce laws,” closely related to the jurisdictional issue in
the case.144  Paul Cassell’s involvement in the Fourth Circuit
appeal in Dickerson was likely the reason he was tapped to
argue before the Court in that case, but his profile in criminal
law would arguably have made him a natural selection even if
he had not been involved below.145  Stephanos Bibas, a promi-
nent criminal law scholar, was invited to argue a question of
district court sentencing authority in Tapia v. United States.146
And the two academics discussed in the preceding section,
John Manning and Vicki Jackson, both clearly possessed rele-
vant subject matter expertise when it came to the jurisdictional
issues in both Windsor and Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medi-
cal Center.147
No similar subject matter expertise, however, appears to
link the non-academics to the cases for which they are se-
lected, at least in ways that are obvious from the public record.
Indeed, one of the most striking features of the amicus data is
how little subject matter expertise appears to drive most ap-
pointments.  Compared to the preceding two factors—relation-
ships and geography—the explanatory power of subject matter
expertise is thus quite limited.
4. Previous Supreme Court Advocacy
One of the most interesting and surprising findings in the
amicus dataset is the presence of first-time Supreme Court
advocates among the amicus ranks.  Indeed, it appears that
thirty-three of the fifty-nine invited amici, or 56%, had never
previously argued before the Court at the time of their invita-
tions.  Just in the past six years, nine invited amici (all of whom
144 Goldman, supra note 11, at 916. R
145 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000). See Brief for the Washington Legal Foundation
and Safe Streets Coalition as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant United States,
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (amicus brief below);
Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s Failures in Dickerson,
99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 898–99 & n.2 (2001) (describing Cassell’s brief and oral
argument before the Fourth Circuit).
146 131 S. Ct. 975 (2011) (appointment memo).
147 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013).
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are former law clerks to the Justices) who had never argued
before the Court were invited to do so.148
As detailed above, recent work on the modern Supreme
Court bar argues convincingly that both the Court and the
development of the law have been profoundly impacted by the
increasing dominance of Supreme Court practice by a small,
elite group of “expert” practitioners.149  And at first glance, the
Court’s invitation practices appear consistent with this general
trend: that is, they involve a relatively small group of elite attor-
neys, generally with connections to the Court or at least to one
of the Justices, and their backgrounds frequently resemble
those of the elite practitioners who make up the Supreme Court
bar.150  But the fact that the majority of amici in recent years
have been first-time advocates may represent an important dis-
tinction between the appointment phenomenon and other
trends at the Court.151
5. Diversity
In reviewing the fifty-nine amicus invitations the Court has
issued, the lack of demographic diversity is immediately strik-
ing.  This is to be expected in the case of early invitations, but
the continuing exclusion of women and minorities from the
amicus ranks is surprising.  Only six of fifty-nine amici, or just
over 10%, have been women, with five of those six invitations
issued in just the last seven years (that is, prior to 2009 only
one woman, Maureen Mahoney, had ever been invited to argue
as an amicus).152
148 Beginning with the most recent, they are: Welch v. United States, 136 S.
Ct. 892 (2016) (appointment memo) (Helgi Walker); Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct.
2150, 2152 (2015) (William Peterson); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013) (Vicki Jackson); Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1442 (2013)
(Jeffrey Bucholtz); Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1466 (2012) (Evan A.
Young); Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011) (Stephanos Bibas); Pepper
v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 479 (2011) (Adam Ciongoli); Reed Elsevier v.
Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 156 (2010) (Deborah Merritt); and Kucana v. Holder,
558 U.S. 233, 236 (2010) (Amanda Leiter).  I should note that this analysis does
not consider experience briefing Supreme Court cases, something many amici
have done, even where they have not previously argued.
149 See supra notes 18–42 and accompanying text (arguing that Supreme R
Court practice has become an increasingly specialized enterprise).
150 Many of these first-time Supreme Court advocates are appellate attorneys,
who may have argued previously before state and federal appellate courts, but
they are nonetheless first-time Supreme Court advocates.
151 I take up the question of the significance of first-time advocates infra p.
1584.
152 They are: Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 484 U.S. 809 (1987) (Mau-
reen Mahoney); Kucana v. Holder, 557 U.S. 951 (2009) (Amanda Leiter); Reed
Elsevier v. Muchnik, 556 U.S. 1161 (2009) (Deborah Merritt); United States v.
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Overall data on demographic diversity within the Supreme
Court bar is quite limited, but based on the few existing compi-
lations, these numbers appear even lower than the already-low
overall percentages.  One recent article tracked the demo-
graphic makeup of “top” Supreme Court advocates, which the
author defined as any advocate who had argued before the
Court five or more times from 2000–2012.  Of the eighty-three
top advocates the article identified, the author found that fif-
teen were women (18%).153  And figures in recent Terms have
been similar: in the 2012 Term, 17% of Supreme Court advo-
cates were women,154 while in the 2015 Term, the figure was
23%.155  The amicus invitation figure is far lower than either of
these.
In addition, it appears that only three of the fifty-nine ami-
cus invitees—5%—have been African American or Latino,156
with no Asian Americans I have been able to identify in the
dataset.  Like the gender figure, this figure lags behind the
overall percentage at the Court.  The same study described
above found that of the eighty-three top practitioners between
2000 and 2012, nine—or 11%—of the advocates were not
white.157
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 814 (2012) (Vicki Jackson); Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 14
(2015) (Catherine M.A. Carroll); and Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 892 (2016)
(Helgi Walker).
153 Kedar S. Bhatia, Note, Top Supreme Court Advocates of the Twenty-First
Century, 1 J. LEGAL METRICS 561, 575 (2013).
154 See Mark Sherman, Diversity Lacking Among Lawyers Who Argue Cases to
Supreme Court, THE DENVER POST, May 13, 2013, http://www.denverpost.com/
ci_23229359/diversity-lacking-among-lawyers-who-argue-cases-supreme
[https://perma.cc/V2T7-TK4Y].
155 Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Specialists, Mostly Male, Dominated Argument
this Term, NAT’L L.J., May 16, 2016, at 1.
156 They are: Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (2012) (Miguel
Estrada); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 15 (1990) (Barrington Parker, Jr., now
on the Second Circuit); and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 576
(1983) (William T. Coleman, Jr.).  This figure is more tentative than the gender
figure because I have not been able to determine amicus race with absolute
confidence in several instances, but it appears that all of the remaining fifty-six
advocates have been white.
157 Bhatia, supra note 152, at 576—though the 11% figure includes a number
of Asian American advocates; see also Mark Sherman, Black Lawyers Rare at
Supreme Court, USA TODAY, Oct. 28, 2007, http://www. usatoday.com/news/
washington/2007-10-28-3842117658_x.htm [https://perma.cc/UYY2-GNFZ]
(“Several factors account for the dearth of minorities at the court: continuing
problems in recruiting and retaining blacks and other minorities at the top law
firms; the rise of a small group of lawyers who focus on Supreme Court cases; the
decline in civil rights cases that make it to the high court; and the court’s dwin-
dling caseload.”).
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6. Outcomes
Of the fifty-six decided cases involving invited amici,158
thirty-eight can be classified as losses and eighteen wins, for an
approximate win rate of 32%.  (In two cases, cert was denied as
improvidently granted,159 and in one case the Court did not
reach the question the amicus had been invited to argue.160)  At
least an initial analysis, then, suggests that amicus win rates
are not especially high—though in light of the nearly-hopeless
task of many amici, who are often invited to take a position
even the winning party will not defend,161 perhaps the rate is
rather high after all.  Former clerk win rates are higher than the
win rates of amici who did not clerk, although not dramatically
so.
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I have coded these cases as wins or losses, but I am mind-
ful of Richard Lazarus’s caution that “[t]he content of the
Court’s opinion is almost always far more important than the
formal judgment.”162  As the piece continues: “Binary analysis
158 See Appendix.
159 Ogbomon v. United States, 519 U.S. 1073 (1997); Vermont v. Cox, 484 U.S.
173 (1987).
160 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (severability).
161 Cf. Stephen R. McAllister, Federalism and Retroactivity in State Post-Con-
viction Proceedings, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 271, 284 (2015) (predicting, regarding the
then-pending amicus invitation in Montgomery v. Louisiana, that “(1) the amicus
appointed in Montgomery will thoroughly enjoy the opportunity, (2) the Court will
be grateful to him for providing such service, and (3) the Court will rule against his
jurisdiction position unanimously.”).
162 Richard J. Lazarus, The Power of Persuasion Before and Within the Su-
preme Court: Reflections on NEPA’s Zero for Seventeen Record at the High Court,
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 231, 252 (2012).
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that treats Supreme Court rulings as either ‘wins’ or ‘losses’
misapprehends the nature of judicial rulings and the essential
role served by legal reasoning.  Not all losses are created
equal.”163  Mindful of that concern, the next part attempts to
engage with outcomes in a more nuanced and less binary
fashion.
Another vector on which to assess the “outcome” of amicus
appointments is their effect on the advocates themselves.
Here, anecdotal evidence suggests that an appointment by the
Court confers significant professional, reputational, and in
some instances even concrete monetary advantages.  Just as
Supreme Court clerkships or positions in the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s office can place a young attorney in the “pipeline to
power,”164 so too may the opportunity to argue before the Court
provide or amplify such advantages, particularly for an attor-
ney relatively early in his or her career.
In 2010, Adam Liptak interviewed Adam Ciongoli, a former
Alito clerk who argued Pepper v. United States165 approxi-
mately four years after finishing his clerkship.  Liptak reported
that Ciongoli, a first-time advocate, prepared for months for the
argument, mostly at night and on the weekends, and “was paid
solely in prestige.”166
Tony Mauro suggests in a different piece that invitations to
argue actually “launched the Supreme Court appellate careers
of several former high court clerks.  Among them: Chief Justice
Roberts and Maureen Mahoney.”167  While it is difficult to draw
a causal link between one event like a Supreme Court invita-
tion and subsequent career developments, it is at least plausi-
ble that these early experiences had some impact on the career
163 Id. at 231.
164 Linda Greenhouse, Keynote Speech at the 2012 Pipeline to Power Sympo-
sium (2012), in 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1433, 1436; see also Christopher Avery et
al., The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 450
(2007) (“Federal court clerkships are also often stepping stones to various elite
legal posts.”).
165 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011); Charles Lane, Alito Hires as a Clerk Former Ash-
croft Aide, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2006/02/14/AR2006021401811.html [https://perma.cc/A7SY-
52KG] (noting that Justice Alito hired Ciongoli as his law clerk at the Supreme
Court in 2006).
166 Adam Liptak, Court Chooses Guardians for Orphaned Arguments, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/us/14bar.html?
_r=0 [https://perma.cc/BEN4-H5QB].
167 Mauro, supra note 96.  Mauro also argues that where ex-clerks are invited R
to return to the Court to argue as amici, “the intangible rewards for the lawyer are
great, representing yet another way in which a Supreme Court clerkship can be a
ticket to top-tier career opportunities.” Id.
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paths of the invited attorneys.  And more immediately, in pri-
vate practice, the difference between no Supreme Court argu-
ments and a single Supreme Court argument may be quite
significant, for everything from billing rates to the likelihood of
being entrusted with future Supreme Court arguments.
III
ANALYSIS
Having first framed and then described the practice of ami-
cus invitation, this section identifies several of the broader
themes and dynamics that emerge from examining the prac-
tice.  It begins with a discussion of the categories of cases in
which the Court invites amicus participation.  It then asks
what the sort of review conducted here can tell us (since the
Court gives no explicit guidance on this score) about the role of
the invited amicus: the identity of the client, the nature of the
mandate, and the precise relationship between the amicus and
the Court.  Finally, it explores more deeply the question of rela-
tionships—in particular, what the Justices’ increasing ten-
dency to turn to former law clerks to serve this function might
tell us about the Court today.
A. Reason for the Appointment
Though they share a name, not all amicus invitations are
alike.  They do, however, cluster into several discrete catego-
ries, raising some distinct conceptual issues that merit brief
discussion here.
Many amicus invitations involve what can be broadly de-
scribed as confessions of error—either an error by the govern-
ment itself, as where the Solicitor General’s office decides to
disavow a position taken by litigators below, or an error by the
lower court or courts.168  Much of the time, cases in this cate-
gory involve a decision by the federal government not to defend
or press for a victory, for various institutional and legal rea-
sons.  As I have argued elsewhere, there are considerable ad-
vantages to permitting government entities to change positions
in litigation, including by declining to defend statutes they have
concluded are unconstitutional;169 from this perspective, the
168 Goldman, whose focus is on Article III concerns, slices the cases slightly
differently, dividing out Solicitor General error confessions and changes in posi-
tion from cases in which neither party accepts a sua sponte decision of the lower
court. See Goldman, supra note 11, at 918. R
169 See Katherine Shaw, Constitutional Nondefense in the States, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 213, 263–71 (2014) (defending executive nondefense).
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practice of amicus invitation enables the government to make
such decisions without undermining courts’ ability to answer
important questions. Dickerson supplies the best example of
this phenomenon; in that case, one of the most important in-
stances of constitutional nondefense by the federal executive,
the federal government argued in the Supreme Court against
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (and in support of the
view that Miranda was a constitutional rule); at the invitation of
the Court, Paul Cassell stepped in to fill the gap.170  In a more
representative example, the federal government in Ornelas v.
United States, after arguing below that appellate review of a
lower court’s finding of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause should be for clear error, joined with the petitioner before
the Supreme Court in arguing for a de novo standard.171  The
Court accordingly invited attorney Peter Isakoff to defend the
lower court judgment.172
In other cases, the Court itself raises an issue or question it
wishes to consider, but which the parties have not presented.
A recent example in this category is Windsor, in which amicus
Vicki Jackson was asked to brief and argue the position that
the executive branch, which agreed with the plaintiff on
DOMA’s unconstitutionality, was without authority to invoke
the Court’s jurisdiction; and, additionally, that the Bipartisan
Legal Advisory Group lacked Article III standing.173 Alabama v.
Shelton is a slightly older example; in that case, amicus Charles
Fried was invited to argue the position that the Sixth Amend-
ment did not bar imposition of a suspended criminal sentence
even where the original conviction had been obtained without
counsel,174 although the state of Alabama agreed with Shelton
that the Sixth Amendment did not allow the imposition of such
a sentence.175
170 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000); see supra note 143 and accompanying text. R
171 See Brief for the United States at 11, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690 (1996) (No. 95-5272) (“A court of appeals should apply a de novo standard of
review to a trial court’s holding of whether the facts known to law enforcement
officers add up to the reasonable suspicion or probable cause required to justify
the warrantless search or seizure in question.”).
172 516 U.S. 1008 (1995) (appointment memo).
173 133 S. Ct. 814 (2012) (appointment memo).
174 534 U.S. 987 (2001) (appointment memo).
175 Specifically, as the Court explained, “Alabama now concedes that the Sixth
Amendment bars activation of a suspended sentence for an uncounseled convic-
tion, but maintains that the Constitution does not prohibit imposition of such a
punishment as a method of effectuating probationary punishment.” Alabama v.
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 660–61 (2002).
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In a third category of cases, the Court invites amicus par-
ticipation where one party to a case simply fails to appear or to
respond to communications with the Court. New York v. Harris
is one such example: in that case amicus (now Judge) Barring-
ton Parker, Jr., was invited to argue for suppression of a con-
fession as insufficiently attenuated from an unlawful search,
after the criminal defendant in the case failed to respond to
numerous communications from the Clerk’s office.176  And in
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Court invited
the participation of amicus Charles Lipsey after being notified
that the respondent had not authorized its counsel to partici-
pate in Supreme Court litigation in the case.177
Finally, in a small subset of these cases, the Court appears
simply to conclude that the quality of the advocacy on one side
of a question is not sufficient to enable it to decide a case.  The
presidential power case Myers v. United States, discussed
above,178 was such a case.  Myers did have his own attorney;
although that attorney had twice failed to appear for oral argu-
ment, he did file several briefs and ultimately did participate in
the argument in which amicus George Pepper appeared.179  An
even clearer example of such a case is Lambert v. California,180
in which attorney quality almost certainly drove the Court’s
appointment.  The Court first considered Lambert, which
raised the question of the constitutionality of a California felon
registration statute, in the 1956 Term.  But rather than decid-
ing the case, the Court set the case for reargument the next
176 492 U.S. 934 (1989). See also Memorandum from Clerk Joseph F. Spaniol
to Justice Marshall (Aug. 8, 1989) (papers of Justice Blackmun) (on file with
author) (“The respondent, Bernard Harris, has been asked to tell us the name of
the attorney who will be representing him . . . .  To date, we have had no re-
sponse.  . . .  Efforts to reach Mr. Harris by phone have been to no avail.”).
177 487 U.S. 1231 (1988). See also Memorandum from Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy to the Conference (June 28, 1988) (on file with author) (“The Conference
requested me to recommend an attorney for appointment as amicus in this
case.  . . . After checking, I recommend Charles Lipsey . . . .  Each of you has far
more extensive knowledge of the D.C. Bar than I do, and I will be pleased to defer
to you if you have an alternate suggestion.”).  Another case that appears roughly
to fall into this category is Levin v. United States; after his pro se petition was
granted, petitioner Levin spent weeks negotiating with a number of firms about
their offers of free representation, until the Court simply invited James Feldman
to argue the case. See 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012) (appointment memo); see also Joan
Biskupic, Special Report: For Top U.S. Lawyers, Case in Guam is Rare Prize,
REUTERS (June 18, 2013, 7:01 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
court-coterie-special-report-idUSBRE95H0DD20130618 [https://perma.cc/
ULV5-ELLH].
178 See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. R
179 See Prakash, supra note 75, at 175 (describing the litigation). R
180 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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Term, appointing former Douglas clerk Warren Christopher to
represent Lambert, in lieu of the attorney who had represented
her below and in the 1956 argument.181  And yet a third exam-
ple is Keeton v. Hustler,182 in which the Court learned on the
eve of oral argument that Hustler publisher Larry Flynt had
discharged his attorney and wished to argue on his own behalf;
the Court instead appointed Mayer Brown attorney (formerly of
the Solicitor General’s office) Stephen Shapiro, who was al-
ready counsel of record in an amicus brief in support of
Hustler.183
B. Nature of the Role
At the conclusion of oral arguments in a case involving an
invited amicus, Chief Justice Roberts typically includes a brief
acknowledgment of the amicus’s presence in the case, usually
hewing closely to a script along the following lines: “[Y]ou
briefed and argued the case at the invitation of the Court, and
you have ably discharged that responsibility, for which we are
grateful.”184  Opinions frequently contain similar language.185
But what exactly is the “responsibility” the Chief Justice refer-
ences in these acknowledgments?
The Court never specifies, at least in its public communica-
tions; nor does it explain who the amicus’s client is—if there is
one—or elaborate on the nature of the role.  In some respects,
181 See 354 U.S. 936 (1957) (appointment memo).  For additional discussion of
Lambert, see infra notes 212-224 and accompanying text. R
182 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
183 See 464 U.S. 958 (1983) (denying Flynt’s motion to present oral argument
pro se and inviting Shapiro to present oral argument as amicus curiae).  The idea
of appointing Shapiro seems to have come from Clerk Alexander Stevas, who
notified the Chief Justice of Flynt’s attorney’s discharge in a memo in which he
suggested the Court issue an order authorizing Shapiro to present argument. See
Memorandum from Clerk Alexander Stevas to the Chief Justice (Nov. 3, 1983)
(papers of Justice Blackmun) (on file with author) (“Mr. Stephen M. Shapiro . . . is
counsel on the amicus curiae brief for Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn.  . . .
Counsel for the other amici curiae have not argued before this Court.”); see also
Jeffrey Cole, Discovery: An Interview with Steve Shapiro, 23 LITIG. 19, 22 (1997).
184 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 57, Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S.
233 (2010) (No. 08-911) (“Ms. Leiter, you have briefed and argued this case in
support of the judgment below, at the invitation of the Court, and have ably
discharged that responsibility, for which we are grateful.”).
185 See, e.g., Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2330 (2012) (“Since
petitioners and the Government both take the position that the Fair Sentencing
Act’s new minimums do apply in these circumstances, we appointed as amicus
curiae Miguel Estrada to argue the contrary position.  He has ably discharged his
responsibilities.”); Kucana, 558 U.S. at 242 (“We appointed Amanda C. Leiter to
brief and argue the case, as amicus curiae, in support of the Seventh Circuit’s
judgment.  Ms. Leiter has ably discharged her assigned responsibilities.”) (citation
omitted).
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of course, the role is clear—to take a particular position before
the Court, whether that position entails defending a judgment
or making a specific argument.  But is the role of the amicus
akin to the role of a private attorney, whose obligation is one of
zealous advocacy, within ethical bounds?  Or is it more similar
to the role of the Solicitor General, whose role requires the
incorporation of other considerations—as one Solicitor General
has described it, “not to achieve victory, but to establish jus-
tice”?186  Does the amicus appropriately consider, say, the
proper development of the law?  And do the answers to these
questions turn on the particular type of amicus invitation at
issue?
One answer might be that all of these amici are in some
ways akin to the original amici who morphed into the unsolic-
ited filers so prevalent in Supreme Court litigation today.187  In
a widely cited piece on the emergence of the amicus curiae,
Samuel Krislov traces the historical evolution of the amicus
curiae in England and the United States.188  Initially an attor-
ney with no interest in the proceedings, who simply brought
matters of law or fact to the attention of the judge,189 the ami-
cus under English common law soon morphed into a represen-
186 Seth P. Waxman, “Presenting the Case of the United States As It Should Be”:
The Solicitor General in Historical Context (June 1, 1998), http://www.justice.gov/
osg/about-office [https://perma.cc/Z5K5-DQM7] (“The Solicitor General is not a
neutral, he is an advocate; but an advocate for a client whose business is not
merely to prevail in the instant case.  My client’s chief business is not to achieve
victory, but to establish justice.” (quoting Simon E. Sobeloff, Attorney for the
Government: The Work of the Solicitor General’s Office, 41 A.B.A. J. 229, 229
(1955))); LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE
OF LAW 3 (1987) (claiming that the Justices “count on him [the Solicitor General] to
look beyond the government’s narrow interests.  They rely on him to help guide
them to the right result in the case at hand, and to pay close attention to the
case’s impact on the law.”).
187 See supra note 6.  For a novel recent examination of the world of these R
unsolicited filers, see Allison Orr Larsen & Neal E. Devins, The Amicus Machine,
102 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
188 See Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy,
72 YALE L.J. 694, 695 (1963); see also Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus
Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1765–76 (2014) (“Interestingly, the original amicus
was the lawyer, not the client.  . . .  It was not until the early 1900s that courts
began to attribute amicus briefs to the organization that sponsored it rather than
to the lawyer who submitted it.”).
189 As one nineteenth century state-court case put it, “[h]e acts for no one, but
simply seeks to give information to the Court.”  Campbell v. Swasey, 12 Ind. 70,
72 (1859).  A law clerk memo in one of the Court’s amicus invitation cases makes
passing reference to this sort of role for an amicus. At issue in Mathews v. Weber
was a provision of the Magistrate Judge’s Act authorizing the initial referral of
certain social security benefit cases to magistrate judges.  423 U.S. 261 (1976).  In
a lengthy discussion of the role of the magistrate in such cases, the memo con-
tended that “[w]ithout oral argument, the magistrate’s function is essentially that
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tative of a third party whose interests might be impacted by a
case.190  The problem of unrepresented third party interests
was only magnified in the United States, with its more complex
federal system and a variety of doctrines limiting access to the
federal courts, and so the practice expanded in the United
States.191
Although Krislov’s piece predates most of the amicus invi-
tations discussed here, the early amici Krislov describes do
seem to supply the closest analogue to today’s invited amici,
who, alone among Supreme Court players, stand in a closer
relationship to the Court than to any identifiable client.192  And
the generally underspecified nature of the role is quite similar;
as Krislov explains of the amicus at early common law, “Inas-
much as permission to participate as a friend of the court has
always been a matter of grace rather than right, the courts
have from the beginning avoided precise definition of the pe-
rimeters and attendant circumstances involving possible utili-
zation of the device.”193  The Court similarly avoids precise
public definition of the nature of the role of its invited amici;
and even its internal mentions of the practice are exceedingly
cryptic.  A memo from Chief Justice Burger regarding Kolender
v. Lawson, a 1983 amicus invitation case, is illustrative.  After
the Court agreed to hear the case, Mark Rosenbaum, Lawson’s
counsel below, notified the Court of his withdrawal from the
case—his client wished to represent himself, “based upon . . .
his continuing commitment to a principle of the right of self-
of a law clerk or neutral amicus.”  Memorandum at 2, Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261 (1976) (on file with author).
190 See Krislov, supra note 188, at 697; see also Linda Sandstrom Simard, An R
Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Effi-
ciency, and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 676 (2008) (“Over time, amici
curiae evolved into third party representatives, less concerned with providing
unbiased scholarly guidance to the court and more interested in protecting the
interests of individuals or entities who were not named parties in a suit.”). But see
Stuart Banner, The Myth of the Neutral Amicus: American Courts and Their
Friends, 1790-1890, 112 CONST. COMMENT. 111, 112 (2003) (attributing the “con-
ventional story of a transformation from neutral to partisan amici” to “a common
but unrealistically nostalgic version of the history of American legal practice.”).
191 See Krislov, supra note 188 at 697–98.
192 Professor Helen Anderson makes this point in a recent piece that offers a
taxonomy of all amici, both invited and unsolicited. See Helen A. Anderson,
Frenemies of the Court: The Many Faces of Amicus Curiae, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 361,
376 (2015) (terming the type of invited amicus explored above “[t]he Court’s Law-
yer,” a “hand-picked advocate who is asked to represent a particular position”).
193 Id. at 695.
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representation before this Court.”194  Rosenbaum in the same
letter indicated his willingness “to assist [the Court] in the con-
sideration of this appeal in any way the Court may find helpful
and appropriate.”195  In a memo to the Conference, the Chief
Justice advised his colleagues of these developments, then
wrote this puzzling sentence: “[s]ince I am opposed to ‘lay advo-
cates’ here, I would lean to appointing Mr. Rosenbaum as an
amicus to argue the case for respondent, with full awareness
that he is ‘neutral in favor of Lawson.’”196
If the murkiness of the mission connects early English
amici to today’s invited amici, several of the cases discussed
here give some clues about the nature of the role (and the
Court’s apparent grappling with it).  First, the 1967 case Com-
missioner v. Stidger featured a question about the tax treat-
ment of certain expenses by a Marine Corps officer.197  After
the Court granted cert, the respondent, a taxpayer who had
prevailed in the Ninth Circuit, informed the Court that he did
“not intend to brief or argue the case here because the amount
involved is so small ($180).  He asks that counsel be appointed
but does not claim that he qualifies to proceed in forma
pauperis.”198  Instead of appointing counsel to actually re-
present the petitioner, a law clerk suggested “that counsel be
appointed as amicus curiae to argue from the point of view of
the taxpayer.  This would give the Court the benefit of the argu-
ment without setting a precedent of appointing lawyers for liti-
194 Letter from Mark D. Rosenbaum to Clerk Alexander L. Stevas (Oct. 21,
1982) (papers of Justice Marshall) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from
Rosenbaum]; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
195 Letter from Rosenbaum, supra note 194. R
196 Memorandum from Chief Justice Burger to the Conference (Oct. 27, 1982)
(papers of Justice Marshall) (on file with author); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 352.  The
Conference evidently agreed, denying Lawson’s request to represent himself and
appointing Rosenbaum in a joint order a few days later.  459 U.S. 964 (1982).
197 386 U.S. 287 (1967).
198 Memorandum re: Motion for Appointment of Counsel #171-2000 (Oct. 19,
1966) (papers of Chief Justice Warren) (on file with author).  The papers in
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), tell a similar story: Joel Klein repre-
sented the respondent below; in the Supreme Court, the respondent first sought
in forma pauperis status and the appointment of Klein to represent him, but Klein
informed the clerk’s office that he had “ ‘indicated to respondent that [he] could
not represent him under’ the conditions set by respondent.”  Memorandum from
the Chief Justice to the Conference at 1 (Jan. 28, 1986) (on file with author).
According to the Chief Justice, those conditions included respondent’s insistence
that he retain “control over the preparation of the joint appendix and respondent’s
brief for the Court,” and also that respondent himself retain two minutes at the
end of the argument to “present important facts that may otherwise be buried by
overgeneralizations.” Id.  Klein did inform the clerk’s office that “he would be
willing to present oral argument in this case on behalf of ‘no specific client.’” Id. at
2.  The Court took Klein up on his offer.
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gants who are not paupers.”199  This framing made clear that
the amicus was not to report to, or stand in any formal relation-
ship with, the petitioner, but rather to give the Court the bene-
fit of the sorts of arguments the petitioner might make.  The
order then described the amicus’s status vis-a`-vis not the peti-
tioner or a taxpayer, but the judgment below (“John A. Reed . . .
is invited to brief and argue this case . . . in support of the
judgment below.”).200
Where the task is defined as defending the judgment be-
low, amici frequently offer alternate grounds on which to affirm
the judgment, including grounds rejected by the lower court.
In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, for example, ami-
cus Stephen Shulman offered a number of arguments for the
position that the lower courts had lacked jurisdiction over the
dispute in question.  At one point in oral argument, Justice
Rehnquist pushed back on an argument—that jurisdiction was
lacking as a statutory as well as a constitutional matter—as
having been rejected below.201  Shulman reminded Rehnquist,
with an audible chuckle, that his task was to “support[ ] . . . the
judgment below,” and explained that he was merely offering an
alternate basis to affirm.202  It’s a brief exchange, but a re-
vealing one, in that it features a rare moment of an amicus
acknowledging the somewhat peculiar role—stepping through
a fourth wall of sorts.
A more recent example highlights the subtle ways the am-
biguity surrounding the role might be made manifest.  In the
2013 case Millbrook v. United States, the lower court had held
that the immunity waiver in the Federal Torts Claim Act was
limited to tortious conduct “that occurs during the course of
199 See Memorandum re: Motion for Appointment of Counsel, supra note 198, R
at 1–2 (emphasis added).
200 Commissioner v. Stidger, 385 U.S. 925 (1966) (appointment memo).
201 Specifically, he urged the Court to find that the Foreign Services Immuni-
ties Act conferred jurisdiction only when the plaintiff was a citizen.  Oral Argu-
ment at 18, Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (No.
81–920), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-920 [https://perma.cc/HX5P-
DCMQ].
202 Here is an excerpt from the exchange:
Mr. Shulman: This Court should construe the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act to provide jurisdiction only when the plaintiff is a
citizen. . . .
Justice Rehnquist: The court of appeals didn’t agree with you on that
point, did it? I mean, it . . . I take it it would have liked to construe
the statute that way, but it felt it just couldn’t.
Mr. Shulman: That is correct, Justice Rehnquist.  I am arguing in
support of the judgment below, and this is an additional ground
which I believe is available to support the judgment.
Id.
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executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.”203
Though ostensibly appointed to defend the judgment below,
amicus Jeffrey Bucholtz took a slightly different position than
the court below had adopted: while the court below had held
that the immunity waiver was limited just to law enforcement
officers engaged in one of three enumerated activities (search-
ing, seizing, arresting), Bucholtz conceded (very effectively,
though unsuccessfully) that immunity might be waived for cer-
tain sorts of law enforcement officials all of the time, whether or
not they were engaged in the enumerated activities.204  That
concession did not adversely impact the named defendants in
the case—prison guards, rather than more traditional law en-
forcement officers like FBI agents—but it was still a very differ-
ent rule from the one the lower court adopted.
These exchanges, though suggestive, in many ways only
confirm both the complexity and the ambiguity that surrounds
the role of the amicus.  The best answer to the question of the
nature of the role may simply be that the mandate varies with
the particular circumstances of the amicus invitation.  And the
diversity of those circumstances suggests that the Court per-
haps should not use the same label to describe what are in fact
quite disparate invitations.
C. The Function of Familiarity
As the findings in Part II make clear, the Court relies heav-
ily on familiarity when making these appointments: the Jus-
tices’ familiarity with any potential invitees and the invited
attorneys’ familiarity with the Court.
There is no question that the Justices’ preference for par-
ties who have had some exposure to the Court makes a certain
sense.  The Supreme Court is an institution with its own norms
203 There’s a similar moment in Thigpen v. Roberts, in which amicus Rhesa
Barksdale is asked “So if you are wrong and the other side wins, what will happen
to the gentleman on whose behalf you are speaking?”  He reminds the Court,
“Your Honor, I am not speaking on behalf of Mr. Roberts.  I am speaking in
support of the judgment below,” and the questioning Justice (unidentified in the
transcript) responds, “Yes.  That means that you are supporting him to some
extent.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 42–43, Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27
(1984) (82-1330), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1330 [https://
perma.cc/AJ7V-XJBT].
Millbrook v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1442 (2013).
204 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Millbrook v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 1441 (2013) (No. 11-10362) (“Where somebody doesn’t have two hats, they
only have one hat, like an FBI agent, and they are on the job and they are engaged
in what normal people would think of as law enforcement activity, maybe that’s
covered.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-6\CRN603.txt unknown Seq: 42 19-SEP-16 16:14
1574 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1533
and traditions, and it is surely at least in part for this reason
that the Court is most comfortable using insiders to serve in
the amicus role.205  In general, former law clerks are quite fa-
miliar with the Justices—at a bare minimum they know their
identities,206 and they likely know a good deal about their juris-
prudence as well.  And, by virtue of their experience observing
oral arguments, they are familiar with the rhythm of the ex-
change with the Justices.  As Justice Jackson explained in an
essay on Supreme Court advocacy many years ago:  “One who
is at ease in its presence, familiar with its practice, and aware
of its more recent decisions and divisions, holds some advan-
tage over the stranger to such matters.”207
Just this sort of familiarity was on display in last Term’s
appointed amicus case, Mata v. Lynch.  Late in the argument of
appointed amicus William Peterson, Justice Breyer engaged in
the following colloquy with Peterson:
JUSTICE BREYER: And—and so we’re getting into what’s
actually I think a tough question.  And maybe it’s cowardly.
But I’m thinking why go into those two tough questions,
when in fact we asked for the answer to a simple question.
There are—you have written a very good brief and I under-
stand what you’re doing and—but I still am sort of stuck on
this, which I’ll put to you.
205 Cf. Mauro, supra note 31, at 15 (“Those experiences [clerking and working
at the Solicitor General’s office] giv[e] lawyers insight into the folkways of the
Court and the kinds of arguments that appeal to the justices.  There’s no way to
overstate the value of that experience, says [Carter] Phillips, a clerk for the late
Warren Burger.  It’s a very warm environment if you’ve been there before.  Every-
one says hello.”).
206 Where the non-expert advocate confuses the Justices, the response can be
unforgiving, especially where an advocate stumbles multiple times. See, e.g.,
Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949)
(“No.  Justice Breyer, what I’m saying is that — .” “I’m Justice Souter —you’d
better cut that out.”).  But see this exchange, in the oral argument in Mata v.
Lynch, the case that began this essay, after a question from Justice Kagan:
MR. PETERSON: Justice Scalia, when Ramos-Bonilla adopted the—
JUSTICE KAGAN: He’s definitely Justice Scalia.
(Laughter.)
MR. PETERSON: I’m very sorry—
JUSTICE KAGAN: And we’re not often confused.
(Laughter.)
JUSTICE SCALIA: It’s a good question though.
(Laughter.)
Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015) (No. 14-
185) [hereinafter Mata Transcript].
207 Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme Court: Suggestions for
Effective Case Presentations, 37 A.B.A. J. 801, 802 (1951).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-6\CRN603.txt unknown Seq: 43 19-SEP-16 16:14
2016] FRIENDS OF THE COURT 1575
MR PETERSON: Well, thank you, Justice Breyer.  I know it’s
the end of the term and I’m asking you to complicate the
case—
JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.208
There’s not much of substance in this exchange; the fact that
the Court is unlikely to want to complicate an apparently sim-
ple case at the end of April during a Term with a number of
significant cases pending (e.g., marriage and healthcare) isn’t
especially privileged information.  But it’s nevertheless a dia-
logue in which only someone steeped in the schedule and
rhythms of the Supreme Court would likely participate.
In addition, some of the Court’s amicus appointments have
arisen very late in the process, occasionally on the eve of oral
argument; in Keeton v. Hustler, the Court’s invitation to amicus
Stephen Shapiro issued only five days before oral argument.209
In such cases, the Court quite naturally reaches for familiar
players (and, in the case of Shapiro, one with a number of
previous arguments before the Court.)
In short, it is easy to see why the Court prefers to anoint
insiders.  But the question, which I take up in the next Part, is
in service of what values, with what implications, and at what
costs.
IV
NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A. Outcomes and the Path of the Law
In some instances, the presence or arguments of an ami-
cus may have profound consequences—either for the case at
hand, or for the path of the law more broadly.  And the magni-
tude of those consequences may argue in favor of clearer stan-
dards and guidelines, regarding both when and whom to invite.
In United States v. Halper,210 for example, then attorney
(now Chief Justice) John Roberts, in his first Supreme Court
argument, managed to convince the Court that where a civil
judgment arose out of conduct that had already resulted in a
criminal sentence, that civil judgment constituted unconstitu-
tional double jeopardy.  Eight years later the Court reversed
itself, calling its decision in Halper “ill considered” and “un-
208 Mata Transcript, supra note 206, at 36. R
209 See Memorandum from Clerk Alexander Stevas to the Chief Justice (Nov. 3,
1983) (papers of Justice Harry Blackmun) (on file with author); Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 464 U.S. 958 (1983).
210 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
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workable.”211  It seems at least possible that the quality of Rob-
erts’ advocacy is what led the Court to reach what it later
determined was the incorrect result.
Another case in which the quality of the advocacy almost
certainly drove the result, along the way shaping the law more
broadly, is Lambert v. California.212 Lambert was argued ini-
tially, and disastrously, by Samuel McMorris, who had repre-
sented petitioner Virginia Lambert below.213 McMorris’s brief
was poorly structured and difficult to follow,214 and the oral
arguments in the Spring of 1957 were something of a disaster,
with McMorris repeatedly resisting the Justices’ explicit re-
quests for the facts of the case or the specifics of the state
statute in question.215  Three months after the initial oral argu-
ment, the Court set the case for reargument, inviting Warren
Christopher—former clerk to Justice Douglas, future Secretary
of State—to argue that the California felon registration statute
under which Lambert had been convicted was unconstitu-
tional.216  Christopher’s brief, which has been described as “a
masterpiece,”217 proved persuasive to the Court, with Justice
Douglas’s opinion for a five-Justice majority holding that due
process prevented the conviction of a person who “did not know
of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the
probability of such knowledge.”218  Justice Frankfurter’s dis-
sent struck a cautionary note, charging that the state and fed-
eral law books were “thick with provisions” that would “fall or
211 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101–02 (1997).
212 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
213 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. R
214 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957)
(No. 590); see also Peter W. Low & Benjamin Charles Wood, Lambert Revisited,
100 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1608 (2014) (describing the brief as containing “a scat-
tergun array of assertions, some of which met their mark, but most of which were
clearly wide of the target and plainly of no interest or persuasive power at that
level.”).
215 See, e.g., Transcript of Apr. 3, 1957 Oral Argument at 4, 9, Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), http://www.oyez.org/cases/1950-1959/1956/
1956_47 [https://perma.cc/GLR2-4GFN] (responding to an unidentified Justice’s
question, “Would you mind stating the facts that give rise to the question to your
argument?  What happened here?”, with “Now, I have planned to go to those as
soon as I get back at—” and, later, from Chief Justice Warren, “Mr. McMorris,
don’t—don’t you think that in response to Justice Harlan’s question that it would
be better for you to tell how you’d come here to this Court, tell the facts of your
case . . . .”).
216 354 U.S. 936 (1957) (appointment memo).
217 Low & Wood, supra note 214, at 1609 (“The Christopher brief was a mas- R
terpiece.”); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae for Appellant, Lambert v. California,
355 U.S. 225 (1957) (No. 47).
218 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957).
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be impaired” if the majority’s opinion were read expansively.219
Ultimately, though, he predicted that “the present decision will
turn out to be an isolated deviation from the strong current of
precedents—a derelict on the waters of the law.”220
Although the Court has not subsequently repudiated Lam-
bert, as it did with Halper, the consensus seems to be that
Justice Frankfurter’s prediction has proven accurate. As one
scholar has written, “Lambert’s notice principle has never
taken off.  Few decisions rest on it, and the principle itself
remains an unenforced norm, not a genuine constitutional
rule.”221  Another commentator argues that the rule of Lambert
has proven most relevant in “criminal law casebooks . . . . while
local governments have proceeded to enact a myriad of criminal
laws, rendering residents and non-residents alike susceptible
to prosecution” without regard for their knowledge of the
law.222
But the fact that the decision has not led to a reformation
of our concepts of notice in criminal law does not mean that its
impact has not been profound.  A recent piece lays blame for
many of the pathologies of criminal law enforcement on deci-
sions like Lambert, which purport to provide protections but
instead concentrate power in prosecutors.223  Other work de-
scribes Lambert as part of “a story of unfulfilled potential,”
regarding “a more humane, moral, and altogether more sound
substantive penal law.”224  To be sure, there is no way to draw a
clear causal link between the Court’s invitation to Christopher
and the effects commentators believe have flowed from the de-
cision in Lambert.  But the amicus invitation is an important
part of the story of Lambert, and thus of the criminal law.
Invited amici do not necessarily need to prevail, as Roberts
and Christopher did, in order to impact the path of the law.
Although Vicki Jackson’s argument that the Court was without
jurisdiction to decide DOMA’s constitutionality did not carry
219 Id. at 230–32 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
220 Id.
221 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 589–99 (2001) (“The system by which we make criminal law has pro-
duced not the rule of law but its opposite.  And the doctrines that aim to reinforce
the rule of law only add to the lawlessness.”).
222 Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1461–62 (2001).
223 Cf. Stuntz, supra note 221, at 599 (“The criminal justice system seems R
characterized by diffused power, but its real difficulty is that it concentrates
power in prosecutors.”).
224 Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law,
96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1998).
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the day in Windsor, it received substantial support from the
dissenting Justices.  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas
and the Chief Justice, insisted that “[w]e have no power to
decide this case.”225  The Chief Justice’s separate writing un-
derscored his agreement with Justice Scalia,226 and Justice
Alito agreed in part, accepting Jackson’s argument that the
executive branch had suffered no injury that allowed it to seek
Supreme Court review, but ultimately concluding that the
House of Representatives, acting through the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group, was able to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction.227
Four votes, therefore, existed in the aftermath of Windsor for
the proposition that the executive branch cannot invoke the
Court’s jurisdiction where it has prevailed below, an unques-
tionably significant development—and perhaps the result of
Professor Jackson’s expert advocacy.
One of the key cases whose meaning divided the Windsor
majority and dissents—at least on jurisdiction—was I.N.S. v.
Chadha, in which the Court considered the constitutionality of
the legislative veto.228  The Chadha/Windsor dyad highlights
something else quite significant about amicus invitations: the
power they give the Court to place substantive issues on the
table, and thus to incorporate those issues into the develop-
ment of the law, or to leave particular issues either underdevel-
oped or unexamined altogether.
The Chadha Court, before it considered the substantive
constitutionality of the legislative veto, examined its own au-
thority to resolve the dispute.  The case pitted the I.N.S. and
Chadha, an alien whose suspension of deportation had been
overridden by a one-house veto, against Congress.  Both
houses of Congress argued that the I.N.S., which had prevailed
in the Ninth Circuit, was not an aggrieved party and accord-
ingly could not appeal.229  The Court held, however, that
“[w]hen an agency of the United States is a party to a case in
which the Act of Congress it administers is held unconstitu-
tional, it is an aggrieved party for purposes of taking an ap-
peal.”230  The Court also concluded that Chadha had standing
225 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2697 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)
226 See id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court lacks jurisdiction
to review the decisions of the courts below.”).
227 See id. at 2711–14 (Alito, J., dissenting)
228 I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 931 (1983).
229 Id. at 929 (“Both Houses of Congress contend that we are without jurisdic-
tion . . . to entertain the INS appeal in No. 80-1832.”) (citations omitted).
230 Id. at 931.
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to challenge the deportation order the agency had issued as a
result of the House’s veto.  Accordingly, the Court proceeded to
decide the merits of the case.  The Court did not, however, delve
separately into the status of the two houses of Congress as
proper parties to the dispute, probably because the parties did
not devote much attention to the question.  The Department of
Justice’s brief merely noted in a footnote that “An adversary
presentation of the issues will be assured in this Court by the
participation of the Senate and House of Representatives,
which have the principal interest in sustaining the constitu-
tionality of [the statute].”231  No other discussion of congres-
sional authority to participate appears in the briefing.  The
Court explained in its short discussion of the issue that, “We
have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the
validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a defen-
dant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs
that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”232  But
this statement, whether correct or incorrect, was not subjected
to any sort of adversarial testing, and the issue might have
benefited from the sort of careful briefing and argument Profes-
sor Jackson provided in Windsor.233
The Court’s divergent approaches to jurisdictional ques-
tions in its two recent considerations of the Affordable Care
Act, NFIB v. Sebelius and King v. Burwell, supply another illu-
minating example of just this dynamic.  The Court in NFIB
invited two different amici to brief and argue separate aspects
of the case—in particular, as relevant here, that the Anti-In-
junction Act barred the Court’s consideration of the case.234  As
231 Jurisdictional Statement of the United States, I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983) (No. 80-1832), reprinted in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1982 TERM SUPPLEMENT
1, 13 n. 9 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1997).
232 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940.
233 Linda Greenhouse has suggested, based on her examination of Justice
Blackmun’s papers, that Chief Justice Burger badly mishandled the Chadha case
in general—that, faced with a difficult case that threatened to upend much of the
business of Congress, he essentially “froze”—and that this saga supplies “dra-
matic evidence . . . of Burger’s foundering leadership.” LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOM-
ING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 157, 154 (2005);
see also Linda Greenhouse, How Not to Be Chief Justice: The Apprenticeship of
William H. Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (2006).  So it is at least
conceivable that the failure to appoint an amicus is connected to the larger be-
hind-the-scenes story of the case.
234 132 S. Ct. 609 (2011) (“Robert A. Long, Esquire, of Washington, D.C., is
invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the position
that the Anti–Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars the suit brought by re-
spondents to challenge the minimum coverage provision of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act.”); see also id. at 608–09 (“H. Bartow Farr, III, Esquire, of
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the Court noted in an unusual explanation in its opinion in the
case, it chose to appoint an amicus “because there is a reason-
able argument that the Anti-Injunction Act deprives us of juris-
diction to hear challenges to the individual mandate, but no
party supports that proposition.”235  In the end, the Court
unanimously agreed with the parties that the Anti-Injunction
Act posed no jurisdictional obstacle.236
By contrast, the Court in King v. Burwell did not invite an
amicus to argue against the standing of the plaintiffs, who
challenged federal health-care subsidies in states without their
own health-care exchanges, despite the presence of what some
perceived as a reasonable argument against standing.237  Al-
though the federal government had argued against the plain-
tiffs’ standing in the court of appeals,238 the Solicitor General’s
Supreme Court merits brief failed to raise standing at all,239
and at oral argument the Solicitor General indicated, after a
lengthy exchange with a number of Justices, that he was “will-
ing to accept the absence of a representation [of changed cir-
cumstances that would defeat standing] as an indication that
there is a case or controversy here.”240  That concession, how-
ever, did not mean that the issue was beyond dispute; Justice
Ginsburg began the arguments by posing a standing ques-
tion,241 and the standing exchanges with both the Solicitor
General and the petitioners’ counsel occupied a full eleven
pages of the oral argument transcript.242  So it was in many
ways conspicuous that the Court received neither briefing nor
Washington, D.C., is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in
support of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the minimum coverage
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act . . . is severable from
the entirety of the remainder of the Act.”).
235 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582 (2012).
236 Id. at 2572 (Roberts, C.J.), 2609 (Ginsburg, J.), 2656 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
237 See, e.g., Liz Goodwin, Twist in Obamacare Supreme Court Case: Weak
Plaintiffs, YAHOO NEWS (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/twist-in-
obamacare-supreme-court-case—weak-plaintiffs-161925430.html [https://
perma.cc/XP7P-4AYE]; Louise Radnofsky & Brent Kendall, New Questions Swirl
on an Affordable Care Act Challenger; Plaintiff Listed Motel as Her Address, Which
Was Basis for Her Legal Grounds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2015.
238 See Brief for the Appellees at 48–50, King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir.
2014) (No. 14-1158), 2014 WL 1028988 at **48–50.  It was noteworthy, however,
that the federal government presented its standing argument after its merits
argument, a highly unusual sequencing.  See id.
239 See Brief for Respondent United States, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct 2480
(2015).
240 Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)
(No. 14-114).
241 See id. at 3.
242 See id. at 3–7, 39–44.
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oral argument that took the position that the plaintiffs lacked
standing, and that standing was not even mentioned in the
Court’s opinion in the case.243
The point here is not that the Court was incorrect in any of
its decisions to invite, or not to invite, amici in any of these
cases.  Indeed, there may well have been principled reasons to
make each decision as it did.  But without any public guide-
lines or explanation, it is impossible to make such a determina-
tion.  And decisions this consequential merit a higher degree of
both rigor and transparency.
B. Diversity, Revisited
One set of critiques of both the opaque processes described
above, and the results of those processes, sounds in concerns
about diversity—both demographic and experiential.
Why should we be concerned that advocates before the
Court be diverse—that is, that they be drawn from a relatively
broad cross-section of the population?  One reason is the con-
siderable evidence that diverse groups produce better out-
comes—specifically, that they are better at problem-solving
and decision-making—than homogenous groups, even when
those homogeneous groups are composed of highly competent
individuals.  As economist Scott Page argues in his book The
Difference, experimental studies suggest that under certain cir-
cumstances, “collections of diverse individuals outperform col-
lections of more individually capable individuals.”244  That is,
Page argues, diverse groups not only perform better than their
constituent members would perform individually or better than
otherwise similar non-diverse groups; given a baseline of ability
and a sufficiently large pool from which to draw, diverse groups
243 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).  One difference between the
two cases is that the Fourth Circuit in NFIB had held that the Anti-Injunction Act
stripped the court of jurisdiction, Liberty University v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391,
397 (4th Cir. 2011), while the lower Court in King had found standing, 759 F.3d
358, 365–66 (4th Cir. 2014).  An additional difference may have been the fact-
bound nature of the standing argument in King, which would have made the
amicus argument challenging.  But it is not clear why either difference should
have been dispositive.
244 SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE: HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES BET-
TER GROUPS, FIRMS, SCHOOLS, AND SOCIETIES 133 (2007).  These conditions include
that the problem be difficult (otherwise any problem solver would be able to find
the best solution), id. at 159; that “all problem solvers are smart” (an oversimplifi-
cation of what Page terms “the calculus condition”—in essence, that the members
of the group must have some knowledge that is relevant to the problem at hand),
id. at 160; there must be genuine diversity (that is, not all problem-solvers in a
group should identify the same solution), id. at 160–61; and the pool must be
large enough, id. at 162.
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will perform better than non-diverse groups, even where the
non-diverse groups are composed exclusively of individuals of
higher “ability”245 than the diverse groups.
This is a striking finding, and Page offers one possible ex-
planation: “The best problem solvers tend to be similar; there-
fore, a collection of the best problem solvers performs little
better than any one of them individually.  A collection of ran-
dom, but intelligent, problem solvers tends to be diverse.  This
diversity allows them to be collectively better.”246
Page’s work is largely concerned with group problem solv-
ing and decision making.  So while the applicability of his the-
ory to certain dimensions of Supreme Court practice—the
Justices’ own deliberative processes, for example—may be self-
evident, its relevance to the invited outside attorneys who are
the focus of this Essay is less obvious.  Are these attorneys
participants in a decisional process that would bring them
within the reach of Page’s theory?  Put differently, is making
legal arguments analogous to solving problems in the way Page
describes?
Perhaps not perfectly.  But in several senses the endeavors
are similar.  First, drafting briefs and preparing for oral argu-
ments is often a deeply collaborative undertaking, and the
briefs filed by amici today typically contain a number of names
on their covers, beyond the direct recipients of the Court’s invi-
tations.  Those individuals closely resemble, at least experien-
tially, the actual invitees, who are in broad terms elite members
of the world of Supreme Court advocates (even if they are
presenting their first oral arguments, as is often the case with
recent invitees).  In some sense, then, it may be that the indi-
viduals the Court currently relies upon are all “smart” in the
same way—they share roughly similar backgrounds and thus
approach the task of making arguments before the Court in
similar ways.247  As social scientists have noted in the context
of interest groups and unsolicited amicus filings, “groups of the
245 Id. at 164; see also Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Groups of Diverse Problem
Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers, 101 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 16385, 16389 (2004) (explaining that the reason groups of diverse
problem solvers outperform groups of problem solvers composed of higher-ability
individuals is that in large groups of problem solvers, “the very best problem
solvers must become similar.”).  This similarity is an impediment to optimal prob-
lem solving. Id.
246 PAGE, supra note 244, at 137. R
247 Of course, one fix here might be more diversity within the groups at law
firms that work together on the briefs that end up filed under the name of an
invited amicus.  But those employment decisions are not in the hands of the
Court; what is unique about the amicus invitation is that it is.
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same organizational typology are likely to rely on similar pres-
entation styles and authorities in their advocacy efforts.”248  A
similar dynamic likely applies in the context of the Court’s
current practices with respect to invited amici.
Moreover, the advocates themselves are in some sense par-
ticipants in the Court’s decision-making processes.  This may
be particularly true in the context of oral argument, which
Chief Justice Roberts has described as “the organizing point for
the entire judicial process.”249
Of course, if there is force to this argument, it is not limited
to the amicus context, but applies generally to the task of Su-
preme Court advocacy.  So it may be more broadly true that a
more diverse pool of advocates might bring to the Justices crea-
tive ways of approaching cases—ways they might not otherwise
encounter, and that might ultimately enrich and even improve
our body of law.  But it is uniquely in the context of amicus
invitations that the Justices, without any upheaval, could
make small but meaningful changes that would bring a degree
of additional diversity to their decisional processes.
C. Distributional Consequences
As the preceding Part makes clear, the Justices’ opaque
and relationship-driven invitation practices dramatically limit
the universe of parties who might well provide excellent service
to the Court (and might reap the obvious benefits that flow
from such service).  Indeed, the current approach permits the
Justices to dole out the valuable asset of a Supreme Court
argument to friends and former employees, in a way that is
reminiscent of the cronyism and patronage that characterized
government employment writ large before the adoption of the
federal Pendleton Act and various state analogues.250
248 Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Lisa A. Solowiej, Interest Group Participation, Compe-
tition, and Conflict in the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 955, 958 (2007).
249 Roberts, supra note 19, at 70 (“Oral argument matters, but not just be- R
cause of what the lawyers have to say.  It is the organizing point for the entire
judicial process.  The judges read the briefs, do the research, and talk to their law
clerks to prepare for the argument.  The voting conference is held right after the
oral argument . . . .  [I]t is natural, with the voting coming so closely on the heels of
oral argument, that the discussion at conference is going to focus on what took
place at argument.”).
250 See also, e.g., David E. Lewis, Testing Pendleton’s Premise: Do Political
Appointees Make Worse Bureaucrats?, 69 J. POL. 1073, 1073, 1086 (2007) (“One
of the primary motivations for the 1883 passage of the Pendleton Act was to
ensure competent administration of federal programs by creating a merit-based
civil service system.”); see generally CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE
PATRONAGE (1904) (discussing the history of the civil service in the United States).
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The rise of the elite Supreme Court bar may be in part
responsible for the Court’s current amicus practices in two
distinct ways.  First, as the Justices increasingly hear only
from experts, they may in turn be even more inclined to reach
only for individuals who are already steeped in the institution’s
culture.  And second, as practice before the Court becomes
increasingly limited to expert practitioners, who tend to present
arguments in very similar styles and to adhere to very similar
norms, outsiders may find it more and more difficult to perform
in a way that is consistent with the Court’s desires and expec-
tations around advocacy, both written and oral.251
But is the Court’s preference for familiarity enough to out-
weigh the costs of this practice in distributional effects—and to
justify the persistence of something that feels like genuine pa-
tronage in 2016?  The costs to the Court of hearing argument
from a lawyer not fully socialized into the norms of the Supreme
Court would hardly be catastrophic; the Court is not the sort of
fragile ecosystem whose existence would be threatened by the
introduction of unknown outsiders.  The desire for experienced
appellate advocates—who are able to argue in a range of regis-
ters, who are fluent in both doctrine and the policy implications
of various positions252—is surely reasonable.  But it is beyond
dispute that there are skilled appellate advocates without rela-
tionships to the Justices who could nevertheless produce
strong briefs and supply effective oral advocacy.
Notwithstanding the foregoing critique, there is a sense,
perhaps a counter-intuitive one, in which the sort of quasi-
patronage involved in these invitations may actually hold out
the promise of disrupting the domination of Supreme Court
advocacy by the elite bar. That is, although recent invitations
invariably issue to lawyers with some relationship to the Jus-
tices, the Court’s invitation practices do seem to indicate a
willingness to depart from the increasing norm of extensive
prior experience arguing before the Court.  They therefore may
suggest a route to opening or democratizing Supreme Court
advocacy.  Consider that 56% of the invitations in the amicus
dataset were issued to individuals who had never argued before
the Supreme Court; by contrast, the overall number of first-
251 See Larsen & Devins, supra note 187, at 50 (“Supreme Court insiders are R
attuned to presenting the types of arguments and facts that the Justices care
about—they know the Court’s language and they know the Court’s goals.”).
252 See generally MCGUIRE, supra note 26, at 47–77 (“Often, the lawyers who R
litigate frequently before the Court have abilities that allow them to span the
range of legal issues while also serving the specific demands of individual cases
and clients.”).
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time advocates was 43% during the 2007 Term,253 and is likely
even lower today.
It is possible that the Court’s willingness to invite these
attorneys even given their lack of experience may suggest a
degree of openness on the part of the Justices to new partici-
pants in the dialogue that precedes their law-making.  True,
these first-time advocates are both familiar with, and familiar
to, the Court and the Justices.  But their invitations represent
an implicit acknowledgment that first-time advocates can still
be up to the task of a Supreme Court argument.  The challenge,
then, is merely to expand the pool of eligible advocates.
V
SOLUTIONS
There is no question that the relationship-based and
opaque process by which these appointments currently issue is
troubling; the Supreme Court is one of our most important
public institutions, and the opportunity to brief and argue a
case before it is of great (and undeniable) value.254  And, in
addition to the distributional consequences of permitting the
Justices to dole out these invitations only to former law clerks,
the Court’s practices have the possibility of shaping the path of
the law.  So it seems uncontroversial to suggest that in handing
out such invitations, the Court should be subject to a degree of
transparency and fair process, whatever precise shape any re-
forms might take.  At the very least, an element of both regular-
ity and transparency would be a start, since in many ways
“procedural regularity begets substantive legitimacy.”255
In an illuminating discussion of the context-specific nature
of corruption, Deborah Hellman writes:
Suppose I am a public official hiring someone for a public job.
Giving the job to John, despite the fact that he is less quali-
fied than other applicants, because he is my brother-in-law,
constitutes a classic case of corruption.  Here, I act corruptly
because the benefit I allocate is supposed to be awarded on
the basis of criteria that exclude family connectedness.  Con-
trast this example with the following one.  Suppose I decide to
invite John to a holiday dinner at my house.  I invite him,
even though he is a less-gifted conversationalist than other
possible dinner invitees, because he is my brother-in-law.
253 Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1520. R
254 I am grateful to Rachel Barkow for helping me clarify some of the framing in
this section.
255 Baude, supra note 57, at 10. R
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Here I do not act corruptly.  The criteria that apply to this
decision (whom to invite to a holiday dinner) are either com-
pletely within my discretion or, properly understood, include
family connectedness as a valid criterion.256
The question raised by this thought experiment is whether a
Supreme Court argument is the sort of public good that ought
to be distributed in a method that is subject to public process,
or whether it is sufficiently personal, and perhaps inconse-
quential, that there is no such need.  As the foregoing discus-
sion has established, these invitations are too consequential to
be considered purely personal.  And it is difficult to conceive of
an argument that they are “personal” in the sense in which
Hellman uses the term.  Accordingly, they should be “awarded
on the basis of criteria that exclude . . . connectedness.”257
This Part identifies two sites of possible reform.  First, the
Court might revise the selection process to allow for the partici-
pation of a broader pool of qualified advocates.  Second, the
Court could clarify the mandate.  On the latter score, it could
do two things: first, announce and describe with specificity the
circumstances under which it will invite amicus participation,
to avoid the possibility that ad hoc decisions to appoint or not
to appoint will adversely impact the development of the law.
And second, it could provide general guidance about the con-
tours of the role, so that lawyers who are not fully socialized
into the norms of Supreme Court argument might nevertheless
participate.
A. The Messengers
The Court’s willingness to depart from the increasing norm
of extensive prior experience arguing before the Court actually
may suggest that surprising potential inheres in the practice of
amicus argument.  That is, the Court has already conceded
that first-time advocates are up to the task of amicus advocacy.
The real challenge, then, may merely be expanding the pool of
attorneys from which the Court currently draws, beyond indi-
viduals with whom the Justices already have some personal
relationship.
An open application process for amici—analogous to the
systems some federal appeals courts have implemented for cre-
ating pools of willing pro bono attorneys—is one obvious proce-
dural fix.  The Second Circuit, for example, maintains such a
256 Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy,
111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1392 (2013).
257 Id. at 1392.
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panel, with inclusion criteria that are publicly available and
straightforward—primarily, “at least three years of appellate
experience.”258  Such a change would no doubt expand the
universe of attorneys willing to serve to include those with no
personal relationships to the Court or the Justices.  And the
Justices could certainly craft criteria that involve significant
legal experience, including with appellate advocacy.
Another possibility is for the Court to simply pose the ques-
tion it wishes to have addressed—e.g., “does the Court lack
jurisdiction in this case?”—and allow interested parties to file.
It is almost certain that many filers would emerge, and likely
very fine ones.  Given the resources involved in assembling and
filing an amicus brief, it is not clear that this change would
have much of a democratizing effect.  Moreover, the Court
might find itself with multiple briefs making the same argu-
ment in different ways; but, given the current norms in favor of
allowing virtually unrestricted amicus filing, this would not
likely represent a significant change.259  The Court could then,
if it wished to hear oral argument, select from among these
invited filers, although the fact that each amicus brief would
represent the views of a particular outside entity could compli-
cate matters.  Still, this process would be far more transparent
than the current approach.260
B. The Law Clerk Analogy
Both because a large percentage of amicus invitations go to
former Supreme Court law clerks and because law clerk selec-
tion processes once closely resembled current amicus invita-
tion processes, both the history and the contemporary practice
of law clerk hiring are instructive here.261
258 See, e.g., Notification of Applications for Pro Bono Panel, 2d Cir., (May 1,
2015), http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/2015_ProBono_Panel_Recruit
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/9D4L-4EAG].  Other federal circuits maintain simi-
lar lists of attorneys willing to accept a pro bono appointment, but those lists do
not appear to be public, and inclusion criteria are not public. See Ruben J.
Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 323
n.39 (2008) (describing the Federal Circuit list and Rule 29(b)).
259 See SUP. CT. R. 37; see also PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 45 (2008) (“[T]he Court’s
modern rules and norms clearly allow for essentially unlimited amicus
participation.”).
260 Indeed, the Court essentially followed this path in both Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), and Keeton v. Hustler, 465 U.S. 770
(1983). See supra notes 102–108, 182–183 and accompanying text. R
261 For general discussions of the institution of the Supreme Court law clerk,
see PEPPERS, supra note 126, at 206–12; Todd C. Peppers, Of Leakers and Legal R
Briefers: The Modern Supreme Court Law Clerk, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 95 (2012);
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Supreme Court law clerk hiring was once driven almost
entirely by individual Justices’ relationships with professors or
deans at elite law schools.  Judge Richard Posner has de-
scribed the selection process in the 1960s, when he served as a
law clerk, this way: “There weren’t many applications; there
were no particular standards.  Often the justice would delegate
the selection of his law clerks to a personal friend, a profes-
sional acquaintance, or a law professor he was friendly with,
without bothering to screen or interview applicants himself.”262
Justice Stevens tells a similar story about law clerk selection in
the late 1940s, when he secured a clerkship with Justice Wiley
Rutledge:
Willard Wirtz, then a professor of law at Northwestern, was a
close friend of Justice Wiley Rutledge, and Willard Pedrick,
also a law professor at Northwestern, had a close relationship
with Chief Justice Fred Vinson . . . .  Unbeknownst to Art
[Justice Stevens’s Law Review Co-Editor-in-Chief] and me,
the two Willards had had discussions with the two Justices
and believed that two clerkships would be available to us: one
with Rutledge during the 1947 Term and the other with the
Chief Justice during the 1948 Term.  Considering us equally
qualified for both positions, they came to the Law Review
office to find out which position each of us would prefer.
While more prestige would attach to a clerkship for the Chief
Justice, given our advanced age [both men had served in the
war prior to law school], we both wanted the earlier opportu-
nity.  To resolve the conflict, we resorted to a tie-breaking
method, one that I have often been tempted to use during my
years on the bench: We flipped a coin.263
Others describe geography as a key factor in the Justices’
early hiring decisions.264  According to one anecdote, Justice
Hugo Black was generally inclined to hire law clerks from Ala-
David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 963–68 (2007) (book review).
262 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court and Celebrity Culture, 88 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 299, 301 (2013).  Ward & Weiden paint a similar picture, although they
suggest that the justices did receive unsolicited applications, even before the
dawn of the current era in law clerk hiring. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 48, at 56. R
263 John Paul Stevens, A Personal History of the Law Review, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 25, 26 (2006).
264 Christopher R. Benson, A Renewed Call for Diversity Among Supreme Court
Clerks: How a Diverse Body of Clerks Can Aid the High Court as an Institution, 23
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 23, 27 (2007) (“Selection during earlier years was compar-
atively informal, and Justices often based their decisions on idiosyncrasies such
as geography.”).
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bama, if “suitable” candidates from Alabama could be
located.265
By contrast, every Justice now employs a law clerk hiring
process that is, at least in theory, open and competitive.  The
basic criteria for eligibility are relatively transparent—gradua-
tion at or near the top of the class at an elite law school, gener-
ally followed by a clerkship for a federal appellate judge—
although many Justices continue to rely heavily on personal
relationships with members of law school faculties.  Some also
use screening committees to select finalists, or rely on lower
court clerkships with “feeder” judges as proxies for quality
and/or fit.266
The existing scholarship does not offer a satisfactory expla-
nation for the transformation of the law clerk hiring process,
from one based entirely on personal networks and relation-
ships, to one in which every top law student with a post-gradu-
ate clerkship with a well-regarded federal judge is at least in
theory eligible.  The authors of the recent books Sorcerers’ Ap-
prentices267 and Courtiers of the Marble Palace,268 two exhaus-
tive examinations of the institution of the Supreme Court law
clerk, note the increase in application numbers and thus com-
petition for Supreme Court clerkships beginning in the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts, and appear to attribute the increasing
formality of the selection process to this increase in applica-
tions.  But neither book engages in any sustained exploration
of this transformation.
The degree to which the law clerk hiring process is now a
merit-based one should not be overstated; there is considerable
evidence that law clerk hiring, at both the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts, is largely driven by applicants’ academic
or social connections to faculty members or even current law
clerks.269  The point is simply that a process that is to some
degree competitive—and which does at times produce law
265 In SORCERER’S APPRENTICES, authors Ward & Weiden recount a telling ex-
change between Justice Black and Yale Law School Dean Wesley Sturges.  Dean
Sturges wrote Justice Black a letter highlighting three potential law clerks for the
1948 Term, noting that, “We all appreciate that you may prefer a boy from your
home State of Alabama, and I am placing an Alabama boy before you for first
consideration.”  Black responded that if the candidate from Alabama “desires to
be my clerk, I should be glad to have him.” WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 48, at 56. R
266 See Shapiro, supra note 55, at 105. R
267 WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 48, at 58 (“The number of applicants exploded R
during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, and now more than one thousand
applicants apply each year for less than a handful of spots per chamber.”).
268 PEPPERS, supra note 126, at 174–205. R
269 See Avery et al., supra note 164, at 473–75. R
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clerks with no existing connections to the Court or to the Jus-
tices—does exist.
C. The Mandate
Finally, clear standards and instructions might both limit
the use of the invitation power to quietly shape the path of the
law and facilitate the participation of non-insiders.  First, the
Court could promulgate formal standards or rules for the ap-
pointment of amici, explaining in at least general terms the
types of situations in which it will appoint an amicus.  As a
recent Note catalogues, the Court today frequently chooses to
“grant, vacate, and remand” (GVR) in cases involving confes-
sions of error by the government.270  But, as the prevalence of
confession-of-error cases in the amicus dataset illustrates, the
Court also invites amici in many such cases.  The Court may
well use internal criteria for deciding when to GVR a case
rather than inviting an amicus; but to date it has given no clear
sense of what those criteria might be.
In addition to eliminating the sort of subtle shaping of the
development of law that may occur through the use—and non-
use—of invitations in particular cases, clear criteria might aid
outsiders by articulating the nature of the mission beyond sim-
ply, say, defending a judgment below.  Were it to consider for-
malizing the process, the Court might eliminate the category of
invitations that seems most troubling, in part because they are
so subjective—those in which the quality of the advocacy drove
the invitation.271
D. To What End?
Many of these recommendations go broadly to concerns
about transparency.  Transparency in the political branches is
generally viewed as a mechanism of governmental accountabil-
ity,272 although many critics question its efficacy on that
270 Michael T. Morley, Note, Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication, 41 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 291, 309–12 (2014).
271 Note that the Court has other tools it can use when it is concerned about
the quality of advocacy.  For example, in Kennedy v. Louisiana, a case challenging
the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute authorizing the death penalty for the
rape of a child, the Court granted a request for divided argument by another state
with a similar statute, perhaps at least in part because an experienced Supreme
Court advocate and former law clerk was at the time the Solicitor General of the
second state. See 554 U.S. 407, 411 (2008) (“R. Ted. Cruz et al. as amici curiae,
by special leave of Court, in support of respondent.”).
272 See Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN.
L. REV. 617, 619–20 (2010):
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score.273  This democratic-accountability concern makes good
sense in the context of the political branches. But these precise
concerns are arguably inapplicable in the context of the Su-
preme Court—an institution that is by constitutional design
insulated from the democratic process.  So there is a genuine
question as to whether an accountability interest has any sali-
ence in the context of the Supreme Court—and, if not, whether
transparency itself as a substantive value fits poorly with the
role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional order.
While the notion of accountability may be an imperfect fit
with the design and role of the federal courts, courts may serve
an indirect accountability-forcing function vis-a`-vis the other
branches of government—that is, open and independent courts
are arguably critical to ensuring the accountability of the politi-
cal branches, particularly where mechanisms allow courts to
review and pass on the conduct of those branches.  And schol-
ars have argued that the values of openness or transparency,
on the one hand, and independence, on the other, need not
exist in tension in the context of the judiciary itself.  Judith
Resnik, for example, contends that openness promotes judicial
independence: “Open processes serve as a mechanism to make
plain that a government must acknowledge the independent
power of the judge, or open processes can reveal state efforts to
try to impose its will on judges.”274
Government institutions operate at a distance from those they
serve.  To be held accountable and to perform well, the institutions
must be visible to the public.  But in the normal course of their
bureaucratic operation, public organizations—sometimes inadver-
tently, sometimes willfully; sometimes with good intent, sometimes
with unethical or illegal intent—create institutional impediments
that obstruct external observation.  These obstructions must be re-
moved in order for the institutions to be visible and, ultimately,
transparent.
See also Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1339, 1346 (“Foremost among [the aims of transparency], at least in much of
contemporary discourse, is what is commonly described as ‘accountability.’”);
Shkabatur, supra note 46, at 83 (“Public accountability has been inseparably R
linked to transparency; and transparency is routinely regarded as a necessary
precondition of accountability.”).
273 See Shkabatur, supra note 46, at 84 (“[I]t is not clear to what extent current R
transparency policies actually enhance public accountability.”).
274 Judith Resnik, Courts: In and Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV.
771, 787, 809 (2008) (graphically “mapping” the “declining public dimensions of
conflict resolution” in the United States); see also Judith Resnik, Detention, the
War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 665 (2010) (“One
can find numerous affirmations in constitutions and in case law at the state,
national, and international levels about obligations to provide ‘open and public
courts’ and independent judges . . . .”).
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More broadly, Rebecca Brown has argued that accounta-
bility need not be conceived of merely as a “means to achieve
maximum satisfaction of popular preferences,” but rather is “a
structural feature of the constitutional architecture.”275  And
she argues that the goal of this structure is to protect liberty,
not merely to promote majoritarianism.  If she is correct, per-
haps accountability values need not exist in tension with an
independent judiciary276—rather, one central goal of each is
the protection of individual liberty.  And if that is true, there
may be good reason to attend to questions of transparency and
the Supreme Court.
In addition, as perceived governmental legitimacy comes
increasingly to rest, to at least a degree, on openness in the
political branches of government—and, as a corollary, as se-
crecy comes increasingly to be associated with illegitimacy—
there is ever greater urgency to questions of transparency at
the Court.
CONCLUSION
As this discussion has shown, examining the practice of
amicus invitation can shed important light on “where the Court
is today, what cues it responds to, and what kind of dialogue
the Justices are currently engaged in with the legal, political,
and social culture that surrounds them.”277  What emerges  is
a picture of a Court that has become increasingly insular and
cloistered over time, less and less inclined to invite in outsiders
who might approach the law in different, perhaps radically dif-
ferent, ways.  The results of the process examined here, in par-
ticular its distributional consequences and its potential for
impacting the path of the law, should give all serious Court-
watchers pause.
At the same time, there is another side to the story, both
more optimistic and more pragmatic: the Court’s willingness to
depart from the norm of prior experience holds out the tanta-
lizing possibility of expansion of the ranks of the Supreme
Court bar.  The Justices have shown themselves to be comfort-
able with first-time advocates, and this may be a significant
fact in an era of a shrinking Supreme Court bar; the task, then,
275 Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the Constitution, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 531, 535 (1998).
276 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
277 Linda Greenhouse, What Got Into the Court? What Happens Next? Libra
Journalist-in-Residence Lecture, 57 ME. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).
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is designing an invitation system that will grant first-time advo-
cates from outside the ranks of former law clerks to the Jus-
tices the opportunity to participate in the Court’s production of
law.
Of course, the unfettered discretion the Court enjoys in its
invitation practice is not the exception, but rather the rule—the
Court’s recusal practices and its promulgation of its own inter-
nal rules are but two notable examples.  But there is real value
in focusing on aspects of Supreme Court practice that are
shrouded in secrecy for reasons unrelated (or antithetical) to
the integrity of the Court’s decision-making processes.  The
Court’s invitation practices have gone uniquely unnoticed, and
I hope through this Essay to draw attention to both the troub-
ling dimensions of the practice, and the promise it may hold
out.
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APPENDIX
AMICUS INVITATIONS
Year of
decision Case Amicus SCOTUS clerkship
1 1926 Myers v. United States George Wharton Pepper
2 1955 Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith Erwin N. Griswold
3 1955 Williams v. Georgia Eugene Gressman Justice Murphy
4 1957 Lambert v. California Warren M. Christopher Justice Douglas
5 1958 United States v. Cores Clark M. Clifford
6 1967 Commissioner v. Stidger John A. Reed
7 1968 Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS William H. Dempsey, Jr. Chief Justice Warren
8 1969 Daniel v. Paul James W. Gallman
9 1972 Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, J. Robert Murphy
Local 150 v. Flair Builders, Inc.
10 1973 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels Thomas H. Kuchel
of Super 8mm. Film
11 1973 Gomez v. Perez Joseph Jaworski
12 1974 Kokoszka v. Belford Benjamin R. Civiletti
13 1976 Matthews v. Weber Peter D. Ehrenhaft Chief Justice Warren
14 1982 Brown v. Hartlage L. Stanley Chauvin, Jr.
15 1983 Bob Jones University v. United William T. Coleman, Jr. Justice Frankfurter
States
16 1983 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Stephen N. Shulman Justice Harlan II
Nigeria
17 1983 Kolender v. Lawson Mark D. Rosenbaum
18 1984 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Stephen M. Shapiro
19 1984 Thigpen v. Roberts Rhesa H. Barksdale Justice White
20 1985 United States v. Sharpe Mark Jeffrey Kadish
21 1987 O’Connor v. Ortega Joel I. Klein Justice Powell
22 1987 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie John H. Corbett, Jr.
23 1987 Vermont v. Cox Henry Hinton
24 1988 Mackey v. Lanier Collection Maureen E. Mahoney Justice Rehnquist
Agency & Service
25 1988 United States v. Fausto John M. Nannes Justice Rehnquist
26 1989 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Charles Lipsey
Craft Boats, Inc.
27 1989 United States v. Halper John G. Roberts Justice Rehnquist
28 1990 New York v. Harris Barrington D. Parker,
Jr.
29 1991 Toibb v. Radloff James Hamilton
30 1995 Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno Michael K. Kellogg Justice Rehnquist
31 1996 Ornelas v. United States Peter D. Isakoff Justice Stevens
32 1997 Ogbomon v. United States Thomas G. Hungar Justice Kennedy
33 1998 Bousley v. United States Thomas C. Walsh
34 1998 Forney v. Apfel Allen R. Snyder Justices Rehnquist &
Harlan II
35 1998 Hohn v. United States Jeffrey S. Sutton Justices Powell &
Scalia
36 2000 Dickerson v. United States Paul G. Cassell Chief Justice Burger
37 2001 Becker v. Montgomery Stewart A. Baker Justice Stevens
38 2002 Great-West Life & Annuity Richard G. Taranto Justice O’Connor
Insurance Co. v. Knudson
39 2002 Alabama v. Shelton Charles Fried Justice Harlan II
40 2003 Clay v. United States David W. DeBruin Justice Stevens
41 2008 Greenlaw v. United States Jay T. Jorgensen Chief Justice
Rehnquist
42 2008 Irizarry v. United States Peter B. Rutledge Justice Thomas
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2010 Kucana v. Holder Amanda C. Leiter Justice Stevens43
44 2010 Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick Deborah Jones Merritt Justice O’Connor
45 2011 Pepper v. United States Adam G. Ciongoli Justice Alito
46 2011 Bond v. United States Stephen R. McAllister Justices White &
Thomas
47 2011 Tapia v. United States Stephanos Bibas Justice Kennedy
48 2012 Dorsey v. United States Miguel A. Estrada Justice Kennedy
49 2012 Setser v. United States Evan A. Young Justice Scalia
50 2012 National Federation of Robert A. Long Justice Powell
Independent Business v. Sebelius
51 2012 National Federation of H. Bartow Farr III Justice Rehnquist
Independent Business v. Sebelius
52 2013 Millbrook v. United States Jeffrey S. Bucholtz Justice Alito (on the
Third Circuit)
53 2013 Levin v. United States James A. Feldman Justice Brennan
54 2013 United States v. Windsor Vicki C. Jackson Justice Marshall
55 2013 Sebelius v. Auburn Regional John F. Manning Justice Scalia
Medical Center
56 2015 Mata v. Lynch William Peterson Justice Thomas
57 2016 Montgomery v. Louisiana Richard Bernstein Justice Scalia
58 2016 Green v. Brennan Catherine M.A. Carroll Justice Souter
59 2016 Welch v. United States Helgi C. Walker Justice Thomas
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